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Absolute Morality
Do you believe in an absolute moral standard that should be adhered to regardless of context? Perhaps you think morality is relative to certsin cultures of ideologies.
Is an act moral if it increases the sum total of human happiness?
"Is an act moral if it increases the sum total of human happiness?"
I have a similar view to this. An act is morally good if it has a net positive effect on the experience of present and future conscious entities. This seems to be what all moral codes are attempting to achieve: the creation of more positive experience than negative experience.
I have a similar view to this. An act is morally good if it has a net positive effect
That's really silly because you can't see into the future to determine whether a particular action is going to have a "net positive effect". And a net positive effect for who? If I don't like someone and I follow them into a dark alley and shoot them in the head, then that might have a net positive effect for me, but not so much for the person who gets shot in the head. Similarly, if I chop down a rainforest, then that might have a net positive effect for myself, my community, or even my culture, but not so much for the wildlife living there.
I would assume it's a net positive effect with regards to humanity. If you shoot someone who presumably didn't want to be shot then you may cause a net increase of suffering, which is generally considered negative, even if you benefited from the shooting as that person may have had family who will now have to deal with the loss of a loved one. There's lots of if's and but's involved, as the person you killed may have gone on to cause a net increase in suffering themselves, in which case you have contributed to a future decrease in net suffering.
As you pointed out nobody can predict the future, you have to make decision with the information you have available at the time and base those decisions on your moral compass.
"That's really silly because you can't see into the future to determine whether a particular action is going to have a "net positive effect"."
Just because we cannot accurately measure something does not make it unimportant. In my estimation, when people attempt to call an action moral or immoral, they are talking about the net impact of the action on conscious entities.
"And a net positive effect for who? If I don't like someone and I follow them into a dark alley and shoot them in the head, then that might have a net positive effect for me, but not so much for the person who gets shot in the head. "
I stated who: everyone; "An act is morally good if it has a net positive effect on the experience of present and future conscious entities."
"Similarly, if I chop down a rainforest, then that might have a net positive effect for myself, my community, or even my culture, but not so much for the wildlife living there."
The frame of reference is all conscious entities across all time, not you, your culture or local wildlife.
Just because we cannot accurately measure something does not make it unimportant
I didn't say it was unimportant so kindly stop this game where you deliberately misrepresent my words. I said you can't judge the morality of actions based on events which haven't happened yet. If the participants themselves are unaware of future consequences then it cannot be said they made their decisions based on those future consequences, and therefore they cannot have any bearing on the morality of their decisions.
I stated who: everyone
And I stated that this is sheer, unadulterated nonsense. The overwhelming majority of decisions people are faced with in life have NO bearing on general society one way or the other. They only matter to the individual parties involved.
To further illustrate the point that your premise is total nonsense, let's imagine I travel back in time and get into an altercation in a bar with Abraham Lincoln, in which my life is threatened directly. If I shoot Abraham Lincoln and kill him then there is a net negative effect on society, because it loses the Emancipation Proclamation, but how can my actions be deemed immoral if Abraham Lincoln threatened to kill me?
I would have considerably more respect for you if you simply held your hands up when you get busted for talking gibberish. That's the most annoying thing about you goons on the far right: you continue bullshitting even after you are caught red-handed.
"I didn't say it was unimportant so kindly stop this game where you deliberately misrepresent my words."
I didn't say you did, however when you say my idea of objective morality is silly because it's difficult to determine it, I feel the need to remind you that that has no bearing on it's importance.
"I said you can't judge the morality of actions based on events which haven't happened yet."
You actually can if you can determine the relative probabilities of future events in different timelines.
"If the participants themselves are unaware of future consequences then it cannot be said they made their decisions based on those future consequences, and therefore they cannot have any bearing on the morality of their decisions. "
You're talking about moral intent, I'm talking about moral result.
"The overwhelming majority of decisions people are faced with in life have NO bearing on general society one way or the other. They only matter to the individual parties involved."
I wish I had your ability to understand how complex systems interact without even being able to observe the entirety of the system.
"how can my actions be deemed immoral if Abraham Lincoln threatened to kill me?"
If they had a net negative effect on conscious entities then you would have caused an immoral result.
"I would have considerably more respect for you if you simply held your hands up when you get busted for talking gibberish. "
Do you mean like that time when you didn't know what the phrase "equality of opportunity" meant?
There is no such thing as "net positive effect" because positive effect is fundamentally individualized and cannot be effectively aggregated. What constitutes the positive is variable between persons, so what one regards as a net positive effect another will not. This problem is even worse when we are trying to imagine both non-human and non-existent future entities, because we can even less anticipate what their positive effect experiences might be. And to operate from one's own beliefs about the net positive effect is merely to act towards one own value preferences, and not the net positive effect at all.
Nor is it the case that all (or even most) moral codes bend towards consequential utilitarianism. There are countless virtue ethics and other deontological moral codes, not to mention numerous individualist moral codes (and etc).
I think there are a few things that one could consider to be "positive" in a slightly more objective sense. For instance, I think that it would be fair to say that life is generally preferable to death. The aspects of that particular view are objective, there is no ambiguity over what constitutes life and what constitutes death and I think most people would agree.
If we can agree that life over death is generally positive we can begin to make some slightly more objective moral evaluations about what constitutes a net positive effect. It isn't absolute, as your basis is subjective, but if you can agree on that basis you can make objective evaluations.
Consensus does not constitute objectivity. If everyone believes that the Earth is flat that does not make "the Earth is flat" an objective evaluation.
Furthermore your observations that consensus exists about life, death, and their relative value are incorrect. Disagreement over what constitutes life and death are integral to disagreements over abortion, life support, etc. Nor is the value that is placed upon life and death uniform - our opinions are highly variable when things such as criminal history, age, race, sex, etc. are taken into consideration.
Neither is it clear that everyone would agree with you that life is preferable to death (I don't). Am I objectively wrong because you and a majority of others happen to believe otherwise? Of course not; that's just argumentum ad populum. I'm only subjectively wrong according to the values you and others hold. And even if people generally believe that life is generally preferable to death, that does not mean that life is generally preferable to death but that life is generally believed to be as such. That is the subjective/objective gap, and you've failed to bridge it.
Besides which, it isn't at all clear that people share sufficiently similar beliefs about when life is generally preferable to death to believe there is consensus there. Claiming that people generally believe that life is generally preferable to death is misleading because what is meant by the phrase "life is generally preferable to death" is not the same between persons. The ratio of value people place on life relative to death is particular both to the individual and to the circumstances. So there isn't even really an objective fact of that matter that people generally believe life is generally preferable to death.
Consensus does not constitute objectivity. If everyone believes that the Earth is flat that does not make "the Earth is flat" an objective evaluation.
You are correct, but morals are conceptual in nature. The earth is not. I don't believe there is an absolute moral basis, I said that if a subjective basis can be established you can make objective evaluations.
Furthermore your observations that consensus exists about life, death, and their relative value are incorrect. Disagreement over what constitutes life and death are integral to disagreements over abortion, life support, etc. Nor is the value that is placed upon life and death uniform - our opinions are highly variable when things such as criminal history, age, race, sex, etc. are taken into consideration.
This is why I said generally rather than always. Of course there are exceptions, but the morality of life and death should not be considered in a vacuum. You weigh it against other morals and rights. In the case of abortion you have to weigh the right to life against body rights. Morality is much more than just life and death.
The basis is subjective, I said that in my initial reply. I don't believe in absolute morality, but I do believe that objective moral evaluations can be made once an agreement is reached.
Neither is it clear that everyone would agree with you that life is preferable to death (I don't). Am I objectively wrong because you and a majority of others happen to believe otherwise? Of course not; that's just argumentum ad populum. I'm only subjectively wrong according to the values you and others hold. And even if people generally believe that life is generally preferable to death, that does not mean that life is generally preferable to death but that life is generally believed to be as such. That is the subjective/objective gap, and you've failed to bridge it.
Like I said, I don't believe in absolute morality. I would like to hear your reasoning on not agreeing that life is generally preferable to death though, most intriguing.
Besides which, it isn't at all clear that people share sufficiently similar beliefs about when life is generally preferable to death to believe there is consensus there. Claiming that people generally believe that life is generally preferable to death is misleading because what is meant by the phrase "life is generally preferable to death" is not the same between persons. The ratio of value people place on life relative to death is particular both to the individual and to the circumstances. So there isn't even really an objective fact of that matter that people generally believe life is generally preferable to death.
The term generally clears most of this up. There will be circumstances in which life is not preferable to death, I do agree. But like I said earlier, issues involving the morality of life and death shouldn't be considered in a vacuum.
"There is no such thing as "net positive effect" because positive effect is fundamentally individualized and cannot be effectively aggregated."
So if we have two individuals, both experiencing a neutral experience that we will note as +0; their experience is neither positive or negative in valence. This scale goes from +10 to -10 with +10 being the most pleasant experience one can have and -10 the most negative. We expose these individuals to a comedic film, and individual A has an experience of +3, individual B has an experience of +5. We can therefore say that overall the comedic film has had a net positive effect on the experience of these conscious entities A and B. In reality things are far more complicated, however our present inability to accurately quantify something does not mean that it does not exist as a quantifiable phenomenon.
"This problem is even worse when we are trying to imagine both non-human and non-existent future entities, because we can even less anticipate what their positive effect experiences might be."
This is part of why it is oft the case that the greatest evils result from the most benevolent motivations. We can often work out the average effect of simple actions will be, however. Since I just gave an explanation of this on another thread I will paste it here. On average it will be a good thing to save a drowning child. This is because I'm assuming humans overall are morally neutral, which may be incorrect but let's not complicate things further. The effect, on average, that a child will have on others is on average neutral then and thus can be ignored. I also assume the experiences life gives on average is neutral. We look then not to the ultimate effect of saving the child to guide our action (since we assume this is neutral) but to the proximate positive effect of saving a child from drowning. While we cannot know the actual result of our action, we can know in this way if our action will on average produce a net positive or negative effect on conscious experience. If you're skeptical about the efficacy of a probabilistic approach then it may be of help to learn about professional poker strategy.
"And to operate from one's own beliefs about the net positive effect is merely to act towards one own value preferences, and not the net positive effect at all."
Positive experience is a positive effect on a conscious entity, as is giving the conscious entity an increased ability to court positive experience (we do this when we send our children to school, for example).
"Nor is it the case that all (or even most) moral codes bend towards consequential utilitarianism. There are countless virtue ethics and other deontological moral codes, not to mention numerous individualist moral codes (and etc)."
In my estimation every moral philosophy is about net impact on conscious entities. We might look at Randian objectivism as an individualist moral code, yet it is about a positive impact on oneself. Why, under objectivism, one's own experience is to be considered and others' isn't is a question I cannot answer, because for me it logically follows that if my experience matters the experience of others does too. There are nonsensical moral systems too, such as "might makes right" which actually concern the ability to perform an action, not it's morality. I don't think that these take away from what I view as the correct conceptualization of morality: what it appears almost everybody is saying when they claim an act is moral. That is: what net effect the act had on conscious entities.
In reality things are far more complicated, however our present inability to accurately quantify something does not mean that it does not exist as a quantifiable phenomenon.
Winston, you are simply an idiot. The phenomena you describe is not quantifiable because it doesn't exist in the vast majority of cases. Your premise is ridiculous. If Ted buys a washing machine instead of a tumble dryer then that has no effect on any scale known to Dave, Sam and Betty. There is no quantifiable "net positive benefit" to society if Ted buys a washing machine instead of a tumble dryer.
Please shut up. People like you really annoy me because you think you're intelligent and the reality is that you are stupid.
"If Ted buys a washing machine instead of a tumble dryer then that has no effect on any scale known to Dave, Sam and Betty. There is no quantifiable "net positive benefit" to society if Ted buys a washing machine instead of a tumble dryer."
I don't even know what you are arguing, you just gave an example with no information on how conscious entities are effected by either choice.
So if we have two individuals, both experiencing a neutral experience that we will note as +0; their experience is neither positive or negative in valence. This scale goes from +10 to -10 with +10 being the most pleasant experience one can have and -10 the most negative. [...] In reality things are far more complicated, however our present inability to accurately quantify something does not mean that it does not exist as a quantifiable phenomenon.
The problem with your argument is that there is no such scale. Even if experience were bivalent (it isn't), there are no two people who would share identical conceptions of this scale such that it cannot be said that there exists a singular scale at all. Persons A and B might both note their experience at 0, but that does not mean their experience is the same because what 0 signifies to each may be different and cannot be confirmed as identical.
This is part of why it is oft the case that the greatest evils result from the most benevolent motivations. [...] If you're skeptical about the efficacy of a probabilistic approach then it may be of help to learn about professional poker strategy.
You are assuming moral and experiential neutrality in order to prove the homogeneity you need to get a theory of averages off the ground. Not only is that blatantly circular, but it's quite obviously unsound because if it were true then there would be no moral disagreements and everyone would have the same experiences (which plainly isn't the case).
There also is no such thing as an actual average effect because most of the effects from which the average derives will derive from that mathematical average; the effects are not "on average" anything because they remain distinct with their respective attributes, and the idea of an average effect is strictly that: an idea. Even if it could be said that action X produces the average effect Y then: (a) that does not mean that engaging in act X will necessarily produce Y so we still cannot predict whether our action is moral until after the fact which is useless; and (b) that does not mean that people will associate the same experiential value to the effect Y so you can't accurately predict a net value even for the allegedly average effect Y.
The equivalency between poker and ethics is also false. Poker games advance under a predetermined set of agreed upon rules and probability is predicated upon those parameters and insulated against subjective ascriptions of value or experiences of gameplay. Ethics advances under divergent subjective beliefs about value ascription and is not insulated against subjective experiences; the greater complexity of ethics lies precisely in the heterogeneity of experience and valuation which does not obtain in poker.
Positive experience is a positive effect on a conscious entity, as is giving the conscious entity an increased ability to court positive experience (we do this when we send our children to school, for example).
If experiences are considered as a form of effect then that is true, but what constitutes a positive experience-effect to a conscious entity can only be known by that entity for itself. Beyond that the valuation of experience-effect remains unfounded conjecture. We may believe that we send our children to school and that this is positive for them, but only they know whether that is the case and even what that means.
In my estimation every moral philosophy is about net impact on conscious entities.
Asserting that what you view as the correct conceptualization of morality establishes the parameters for what can constitute moral beliefs begs the question, and if true would only serve to make your observation utterly meaningless. Because, yes, if you define morality to preclude disagreement with your moral beliefs then the only ones left will be in agreement... but that's a pretty boring and uninformative observation, the only function of which is to preclude discussion.
Further, asserting logical entailment between your experience mattering and others' experience mattering does not prove it. Asserting that other positions are nonsensical does not prove that they are. And asserting that 'might makes right' does not concern morality is just factually incorrect given that it is literally an observation about the nature of morality. All of which is besides the point, anyways, since whether other moral philosophies are correct, logical, or sensible is simply irrelevant to whether they exist; that we are discussing them as moral philosophies proves that they do and this disproves your claim.
"The problem with your argument is that there is no such scale."
There was no scale to measure distance until one was created. We are talking about something that we cannot yet accurately measure (though we could get a rough measure) yet there is an underlying phenomenon that could theoretically be measured.
"Even if experience were bivalent (it isn't),"
Please elaborate further.
"there are no two people who would share identical conceptions of this scale such that it cannot be said that there exists a singular scale at all."
Regardless of how people conceptualize the scale of experience, there exists a point of maximum possible negative experience and a point of maximum possible positive experience. There also exists points between these that could theoretically be quantified. I don't see how people's conceptualization effects where, for example, the maximum possible negative experience lies on the scale. To me it is obvious that the maximum possible negative experience would be -10 on the scale, why would it be anywhere else on the scale?
" Persons A and B might both note their experience at 0, but that does not mean their experience is the same because what 0 signifies to each may be different and cannot be confirmed as identical. "
This is an issue with measurement through self-reporting which exists for all phenomena when measured though self-reports. Surely fMRI scans would yield more accurate results, for one example. As I say though this is simply a criticism of our ability to accurately measure the phenomenon, not of the phenomenon as existing in a manner that is quantifiable.
"You are assuming moral and experiential neutrality in order to prove the homogeneity you need to get a theory of averages off the ground."
The reason I do this in the example is the same reason that, for example, air resistance is assumed to be negligible in basic physics experiments. Things are complicated enough as they are and as such we simplify so that we can actually utilize the idea. We simply do not have the information required to holistically account for all effects an action will have. As I say, I'm not stating these assumptions are entirely true, however they are necessary to utilize this idea of moral result in daily life.
"Not only is that blatantly circular"
What, specifically, is circular? If you talk of my assumptions, once again, as implied by the word assumption, I am not stating that they are truths.
"if it were true then there would be no moral disagreements and everyone would have the same experiences (which plainly isn't the case)."
If I personally think that the sky is green, does this affect the truth or are people's opinions irrelevant to what is actually true? Is it subjective whether God exists because some believe while others don't? I personally think people's opinions have no bearing on what is actually true.
"There also is no such thing as an actual average effect because most of the effects from which the average derives will derive from that mathematical average; the effects are not "on average" anything because they remain distinct with their respective attributes, and the idea of an average effect is strictly that: an idea."
I'm not entirely sure I understand what you're saying. If giving somebody $10 has an average effect (in and of itself) of +1 to the recipient's experience, can it not be said that giving somebody $10 will on average have a positive effect on the recipient's experience? I'm aware that I have simplified what we are talking about here, but I don't understand how a given action in a given situation etc. cannot have an average effect. If we perform the action 1000 times in situation X then we should expect an effect of approximately +1000 overall on conscious experience. If the action is more likely to have a positive effect relative to a negative effect then surely the action has a positive expectancy. Why is this not effective, given that it is effective in investment and gambling?
"and the idea of an average effect is strictly that: an idea."
Tell that to casinos and investors. Repeat an action with positive expectancy often enough and overall a positive result will be achieved.
" Even if it could be said that action X produces the average effect Y then: (a) that does not mean that engaging in act X will necessarily produce Y so we still cannot predict whether our action is moral until after the fact which is useless"
Yet on average we will achieve a moral result, which is what matters. It is by no means useless to use relative probability to achieve a desired result. People do this all the time, for example asking somebody the time has a chance to yield the desired information, yet the person may also decline to answer or respond with hostility. We weigh up the relative probabilities of these events and thus ask, but if there were a 10% chance of getting shot for asking the time, we wouldn't ever ask the time. The only way to measure moral result for a given act is after the fact, for obvious reasons. As previously explained we can have positive expectancy for an action though, which relates to both moral result and moral intent.
"that does not mean that people will associate the same experiential value to the effect Y so you can't accurately predict a net value even for the allegedly average effect Y. "
Effect Y is supposed to be the effect on the entity's conscious experience and thus should have a concrete experiential value. I am aware that different people respond to the same stimuli differently and thus have different experiential effects from the same stimulus. Imagine an RPG character that has damage resistance 1 takes an attack of 4 damage, his HP will decrease by 3, while a character with damage resistance 4 will lose 0 HP from the same attack. In this case the experiential effect is analogous to HP lost, not the damage of the attack.
" Poker games advance under a predetermined set of agreed upon rules and probability is predicated upon those parameters and insulated against subjective ascriptions of value or experiences of gameplay. Ethics advances under divergent subjective beliefs about value ascription and is not insulated against subjective experiences; the greater complexity of ethics lies precisely in the heterogeneity of experience and valuation which does not obtain in poker. "
I appreciate that you personally believe morality to be entirely subjective, however as far as I can see there is nothing subjective about my conceptualization of morality. With complete information an act can be shown to be categorically moral or immoral in result (if my conceptualizations are accepted as true).
"what constitutes a positive experience-effect to a conscious entity can only be known by that entity for itself."
To some degree, yes. We can however acquire this information by asking the individual or through trial and error. Even in subtle ways, people will let you know if they like or dislike what you are doing.
"We may believe that we send our children to school and that this is positive for them, but only they know whether that is the case and even what that means."
Well contrasted with not giving them an education at all, I personally think it's quite clear which has the best effect on them. You may argue homeschooling is better etc. and that's fine, I mean as opposed to not educating the child at all. If the choices are between education and no education, is it not clear which will provide the better quality of life?
"Asserting that what you view as the correct conceptualization of morality establishes the parameters for what can constitute moral beliefs begs the question, and if true would only serve to make your observation utterly meaningless. Because, yes, if you define morality to preclude disagreement with your moral beliefs then the only ones left will be in agreement... but that's a pretty boring and uninformative observation, the only function of which is to preclude discussion."
I'm not making this argument at all. You disputed that moral codes generally concern "consequential utilitarianism" and I'm stating that it seems to me that they generally do.
"Further, asserting logical entailment between your experience mattering and others' experience mattering does not prove it."
So whether you spend the rest of your life in terrible suffering or not isn't of any consequence?
"Asserting that other positions are nonsensical does not prove that they are. And asserting that 'might makes right' does not concern morality is just factually incorrect given that it is literally an observation about the nature of morality."
"Might makes right" simply states that anything you are capable of is moral and thus morality itself is wholly irrelevant to that account (because we already have the concept of ability). Just as you request evidence, I also would request evidence that ability=morality.
"All of which is besides the point, anyways, since whether other moral philosophies are correct, logical, or sensible is simply irrelevant to whether they exist; that we are discussing them as moral philosophies proves that they do and this disproves your claim."
I brought up "might makes right" because as I say, it doesn't actually seem to be an account of morality at all, rather the statement that morality is ability (which doesn't fit under any dictionary definition of morality I can find). Since morality is about ideals of human conduct or what one should do, to me it makes no sense to say the ideal of human conduct is everything you can do. For one thing, this means that you should kill yourself because you can, in addition to both keeping the cake and eating it. It appears to be an attempt to invalidate morality rather than to define it.
While I don't consider "might makes right" an account of morality for these reasons I can concede that someone somewhere considers it an account of morality and thus not all moral philosophies are concerned with consequential utilitarianism. The vast majority are though, and while I could make up a philosophy that states morality is a winged snake that lives under the sea it wouldn't fit the concept.
I agree that's what they are all trying to achieve, but can an objective basis account for all possible scenarios?
For example there's the old thought experiment of a train whose breaks have failed. There's five people on the track who do not have time.to get off. There's a fat man stood next to you who if pushed can stop the train.
Now assume you have a moral rule that states that you must not kill someone regardless of context and also assume you somehow knew that the fat man would definitely stop the train.
If you choose not to push him in front of the train you are not technically killing anyone, as the circumstances were not of your making.
If you choose to act then you are saving more lives, but you are killing someone by your action. I know what I would do, but how does someone with objective morals deal with this situation?
I'm familiar with the problem you're describing. I suppose I should clarify to begin that I'm speaking of ultimate moral result, not moral intent or proximate moral action. In the case you give the information is nowhere near complete enough to inform action because we don't know who the people are and how they interact with the world. What if the fat man is the scientist that will go on to find the cure for cancer, for example.
It's very difficult to accurately gauge the ultimate moral result of any action because we lack the information and processing power to make an accurate judgement. As such, generally speaking, I believe it is best to only perform very small, simple evil acts in service of good, because it is so easy to go wrong. What if one of the five people on the track is the next Hitler? Every evil action in service of good is a gamble, because we actually don't know what effect our action will have. It certainly does appear, with the information that we have, that pushing the fat man on the track is probably the best course of action. On average one death is going to be a lesser net negative effect than the death of five.
In order to give an accurate, non probabilistic, answer to your question it would need to be simplified. In your example it was deemed necessary to simplify the problem so that the fat man would definitely stop the train. After all, if you push the fat man and there is only a 18% chance that the train stops then a net evil has been committed because 82% of the time six people die. For a hard and fast answer of which action will yield the most morally good result, we would require for the people to have no effect on other conscious entities. In such a case the death of one is a morally better result than the death of five. However, in reality unless we have full information about the people and their effect on others we can only state which course of action will yield on average a morally superior result.
I'm familiar with the problem you're describing. I suppose I should clarify to begin that I'm speaking of ultimate moral result, not moral intent or proximate moral action.
Apologies for the confusion, it's probably my fault for not being clear enough with absolute morality. What I meant was an objective basis for morality, for example it is always wrong to kill, regardless of context.
You are right the problem has been simplified but I think it's more catered towards individuals who have not thought much about morality before or have an objective basis. I suppose for somebody who defines morality the way you do the problem, without the additional information, is no problem at all.
I remember when I first heard a similar problem years ago I spent a long time going back and forth internally about what the most moral action would be.
I wonder, would the next part of the problem factor in to your decision making at all?
It's exactly the same scenario, except you know with absolute certainty that the fat man is responsible for the brakes failing.
"What I meant was an objective basis for morality"
I've given an objective account of morality, I suppose my account doesn't truly fit either side.
"for example it is always wrong to kill, regardless of context."
If that's your definition of absolute morality then I am not a moral absolutist. I do, however, think that a net positive effect on conscious entities is always moral.
"I suppose for somebody who defines morality the way you do the problem, without the additional information, is no problem at all."
My view is somewhat consistent with moral relativism, but as I say it also is somewhat in conflict, because I do believe in moral absolutes.
"I remember when I first heard a similar problem years ago I spent a long time going back and forth internally about what the most moral action would be."
I think the reason that people (myself included) have such issues with it is because it is so far from a real life situation, partly because there would be so much uncertainty in a real life situation. As I say, it is very difficult to actually manage to do make an evil deed have a moral result. What if you push the man and he doesn't stop the train? What if the five people can escape somehow? etc. In reality we wouldn't know that the fat man could stop the train, that the train couldn't somehow stop or reroute and that the five people couldn't escape. If we push the man and any of these assumptions are incorrect then we would have made a bad situation much worse. This is precisely why we have such moral qualms about performing an evil act in service of a moral end: it's so easy to be wrong.
"It's exactly the same scenario, except you know with absolute certainty that the fat man is responsible for the brakes failing."
No change, but then since I'd kill him anyway (if everything else were somehow known for certain) I suppose that is to be expected. It's interesting how we feel that those responsible for a negative incident should bear the consequences rather than those that aren't responsible.
And I can see that Jace did exactly the same thing.
If you have ever wondered why people despise the right wing so much it's because, even in a debate which has nothing to do with politics, you still can't remain honest.
God, The Supreme and Ultimate Reality is The Absolute Morality.
Through faith in God, the sovereignty of God's Kingdom is realized here on Earth, and aligning the heart to accept that is essentially what Christian morality is based on. The discipline is about heart purification. The discipline is about cleansing the heart, mind, and soul of idolatry.
"Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see God"
When God is realized, the next thing that should become evident is how we fall short of the glory of God. Yet at the same time, we are creatures that came forth from The Word of God. We were created by God, so naturally God loves the creation that was declared good from the very beginning. We were created out of love, and we have been forgiven our imperfections because it was the will of God that we were to take the form that we take.
We have been forgiven much by God. As such, we can have peace with God, ourselves, and creation. As we have been forgiven by our creator, we forgive others. It's about being totally honest and sincere about how we fall short of Supreme and Ultimate Reality, and then showing others charity in kind. We're all in the same boat here.
And so the command is
"charity out of a pure heart, and of a good conscience, and of faith unfeigned".
It all comes from loving God, The Supreme and Ultimate Reality, with all one's heart, mind, soul, and strength.
One thing that anti Christian bigots will always do, is try and scare people into thinking Christians want to force them to adhere to Christian moral values.
This is a hideous lie from the Left.
When Christians speak to moral values, we do so to help prevent others from ruining their lives or ruining the lives of their children. We are not trying to force those values on people.
There are absolute moral values such as not killing the innnocent, not stealing, etc. etc. and when a culture has degraded to such a point to not even support this, a nation is lost.
Critics who say moral relativism means you have no morals at all are simply trying to use slippery slope strategy to bring everyone over to the all or nothing side. The truth is pretty much every value is relative and that's why every moral is relative, too. Absolute free speech collides with absolute security (secrets told), saving the most human lives collides with quality of life (weighing 1000 brain dead patients vs the quality of life of 5 cognizant people), even the basic thou shall not kill collides with killing the perceived enemies of your God.
The fact society is able to function within a groundwork of laws adapted to define how behaviors under these rights balance out or cross a line is proof moral relativism works. If you want the legal equivalent of absolute morality you would have to go back to Babylonian Code eye for an eye laws, wouldn't you?
I think that if someone thinks what they are doing is morally wrong, it is, and if they think it is morally right, it is. This is partially because I don't think it would be accurate to call a Nazi a 'bad person' if they honestly believed they were doing everybody a favor by killing Jews. If you are doing what you think is right, who is to say it isn't? I see no absolute or objective basis for claiming that maximizing net human pleasure, minimizing suffering etc, is a good, important thing to do.
I don't generally disagree, but it seems to me that it could be accurate to call a Nazi a 'bad person' if one truly believed they were based on one's own personal morality. The Nazi would of course disagree if they really believed themselves in the moral right, but that doesn't make it inaccurate to say they are bad from one's own perspective; there can be two facts of the matter, no? After all, saying something is good or bad is not really an observation about the thing but about how we relate to it (specifically, whether we like it).
It's all relative to culture. Those who think otherwise do not even understand the history of their own culture and how its moral standards have changed. Even if we take the most ubiquitous cross-cultural example of murder, then it is only considered immoral to kill one of your own species. Hence, it is not an absolute universal rule but rather is relative to the human species. Humans have no moral problem squishing ants simply because we consider them a lower form of life, so it is only logical to expect more advanced civilisations, should they exist elsewhere in the universe, would have no moral problem squishing one of us.