Wait...why am I trying to dispute this? (facepalm).

That first post was a joke anyway. Lol.

And I only disputed that guy, for the sake of the act, which is why i was saying that.

So I was not directing it at anything in particular to this debate. ><

No das nut wut am saying. This is.

For instance: When you do something cool and then someone figures out an explanation for how you did it, it makes whoever did it, sound even more amazing, because of how complex it was. Therefore science can't disprove the existence of God, because science just makes God, sound like a badass.

How do you know that there is more than one universe?

I didn't say there was more than one universe. I said that the cause of the universe beginning must, by definition, be external to the universe. A temporally finite object cannot be internally self sufficient by definition.

To say that God exists out of nature is to basically say he doesn't exist, nature encompasses everything.

I didn't say He exists outside "nature" (an undefined term), I said the cause must be external to the universe. There is nothing internally inconsistent in arguing that something can exist outside of this universe.

How do you know a rock didn't create the universe?

Because a rock, being a physical object must exist within the context of the physical dimensions of this universe. As such, it cannot be independent of this universe and as such cannot serve as the cause.

To say that the world is too complex to have not been created

Strawman fallacy. I did not argue at any point that the universe's complexity is an argument for design. I argued that the specific values of the physical constants precludes the universe where matter forms having arisen purely by chance. It is outside the realm of statistical possibility.

First, a house-keeping note

You are indeed correct, thank you for cleaning up the sources. I should have realized that would happen when I first posted it.

Since you borrowed his whole argument, I would hope you are using his definitions.

I actually do not entirely adopt Craig's conclusions. He concludes a "mind" while I argue "intent-fulness." Similar, but not exactly the same argument.

One other small note - only one source is post 1973; there have been a number of advancements in this area since then.

I don't think that this is an accurate statement. I offered seven sources. Source 1, the philosophic dictionary is a currently and periodically updated source. Source 2, is pre-1976, however it is referencing very basic quantum mechanical principals that haven't changed since that publication. The existence of a quantum wave function is hardly outdated. Source 3 was last updated in 2000, and advances sine then haven't invalidated the standard model as explained. Heck, the viewing of the Higgs-Boson last year was further confirmatory evidence of this model. Source 4 covers minowski spacetime, another extremely basic concept to Relativity and Quantum Mechanics. The link itself was updated in 2013 and reflects current tensor analysis. Source 5 is indeed from 1973 and reflects a theorem first accepted at that time (and still in acceptance now) concerning the basic laws of entropy. It also has a paper by Hawking/Penrose, from 1970 and is discussing an earlier Big Bang theory since rejected, so it being old is moot to the support for the premise. Source 6 is a paper published in 2003 and represents a current cosmological theorem about inflationary spacetimes. Finally, source 7 represents a transcript from 2011, and refers to a philosophic definition, so its age would also seem irrelevant even if it were old.

As a summary, I have 5 sources that date from post-1973 and two sources pre-1973, both of which refer to fundamental concepts not challenged anywhere in your response.

As such, I think this objection fails concerning my support.

The early cyclic models developed in the 20s and 30s had no concept of what we now refer to as dark energy. The current cyclic models do not have an issue with entropy buildup

The two papers you reference by Steinhardt and Turok fall into the category of Ekpyrotic cyclic models. These models propose a cyclical expansion within a larger brane universe where the build up of entropy is within the larger brane, not the individual sub-universes (Section three on page 15 of "Cosmic Evolution in a Cyclic Universe" and Comparing cyclic and inflationary model section on page 12 of "A Cyclic Model of the Universe"). The problem with this is, that in order for the larger brane universe to accomplish this "relief valve" function it must be on average expanding. It thus falls prey to the BGV theorem (referenced above) and cannot be past eternal. Steinhardt makes this argument on his website in the FAQ section (or did until 2007, use the way back machine to see the argument he made).

This seems wholly made up. Forces in one dimension can have no effect on other dimensions, yet there's an exclusion to that rule for intentionality?? based on what exactly??

Neither Craig nor you have produced anything that rules out the Hawking no-boundary proposal. Craig's arguments against it are namely that he doesn't like the idea of imaginary time and that it is currently metaphysical speculation (hello pot, this is kettle - you're black!).

You misunderstand Craig's position here. He is simply pointing out the same thing Hawking points out on his website. Imaginary time is useful fiction for accomplishing the math. It is a necessary introduction into Einstein's equations to avoid the absurdities arise out of an infinitely dense universe. What Hawking doesn't do in the formal paper (but which is done in his proposed papers and by other physicists) is to convert those imaginary time sets back into a real time set to convert back to a model capable of describing reality. When done, that conversion does, in fact, involve a beginning. To quote Hawking himself on the subject: "Only if we could picture the universe in terms of imaginary time would there be no singularities . . . . When one goes back to the real time in which we live, however, there will still appear to be singularities"

Even if not undertaken, the Hawking model doesn't really object to the second premise. Hawking's insight is a way around having a beginning "point" at best. But something doesn't not need to have a finite beginning point in order to have a beginning. A hyperbolic curve does not have a beginning point, but it does have an asymptote beyond which it does not exist. IE as we move across the axis the curve does not exist and then does exist. Hence it falls within the definition of beginning offered in the original argument.

1. Then explain how cause of the cause, why did you stop there?

I'm not 100% sure what you mean here. Do you mean what caused the cause? If so I think you misunderstood premise 1. It is not that all things need a cause. It is that all things that begin to exist need a cause. Hence an atemporal or eternal object would not need a cause since it never begins to exist.

2. There is no scientific proof of alternate dimensions, only speculation.

Agreed, no one is talking about an alternative dimension. We are recognizing the concept that the universe itself is finite and as such there is a logical possibility of outside the universe. This is the same idea Stephen Hawking references or any String Theorist maintains.

3. If God interferes in our life, we should have some evidence of his presence, lets ay you and i were in an empty room (this will represent nature).

1) I haven't made this argument at any point in my debate.

2) I don't see why we should see evidence, humans are not sufficiently aware enough to fully understand what is going on in the universe. A young child might not be aware of a parent if that parent places something before them when their eyes are closed. There is no reason to assume that humans are fully aware of all changes and their mechanisms present in the universe.

4. The concept of omnipresence is itself a hypothesis, there is no back up for this

Also haven't made this argument at any point.

5. Time is not a property, it is a measure by the occurrence of events.

This is incorrect, time is a bound dimension of the universe. It is virtually identical to the three spatial dimensions we are more familiar with. Special Relativity dismissed the idea of time as an illusion nearly 50 years ago. Modern physics operates in Minowski Space, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minkowski_metric which contains four dimensional properties, three physical, one temporal.

6. Judging by some of your arguments im assuming your a christian, there are many historical and scientific errors, the great flood is disproved, creation contradicted by evolution, sun is somehow created after light, the earth is round (not flat as suggested in the bible), diseases are not caused by demonic possesion, etc

1) Again, not my argument anywhere here.

2) Most of these rely on strawman arguments. For example, light did exist before our star the sun existed, it is, in fact, about 9 billion years older than our star. The bible does not suggest the world was flat, that is a blatant misreading of the text. There is historical precedence for a large flood (the breaking of a large ice dam at the end of the last ice age wiped out most of the human population in that region at the end of the last ice age), etc, etc.

Come now, certainly you can do better than linking me to random Youtube videos. Please actually post a rebuttal or withdraw from the debate.

It's fun to plagiarize huh? http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=Kalam

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Now, as for the response to you:

Answer: this argument is an example of "proof by logic", where philosophers attempt to "demonstrate" God with a logical syllogism alone, devoid of any confirming evidence.

This was the first hint that you had simply plagiarized your response rather than actually read my post. You'll note that I did offer external confirming evidence including current cosmological consensus on the age of the universe. References to the Standard Model of Cosmology, which relies on confirmatory evidence. And current understanding of set theory and mathematics.

So, it is clear that your "response" is at best, a strawman.

1. any pre-existing entity/entities that caused the universe do not have to be personal with a mind and will

This is shown in my initial reply to you: "3) Intentfulness. This conclusion arises from the observed temporal finiteness of the universe. We know that the cause cannot be a mechanistic cause (IE if the cause exists the effect exists) because we can describe a state of affairs where the cause exists, but the effect does not. This is really a long winded method of saying “the universe began.”

Likewise, we can say that the cause is not a probabilistic cause either. Probabilistic causes require a dimension to act along. IE along a temporal dimension (chance over time) or a physical one (chance over distance). However, all probabilistic causes must act along the dimensions that they elicit effects within. IE, a quantum wave function acts along a temporal and physical dimension to create an effect in both (a particle’s location). You cannot have a quantum wave function (or any other probability function) that only discusses time, but produces a physical effect.

Given now that we’ve ruled out those two methods of causation we are only left with intent. Only a cause that has an intent can demonstrate the attributes labeled above. Only an intentful cause can create information that is not found within itself. IE all causes except intentful ones have temporal information within them if they act temporally, physical information within them if they act physically, etc. Only intentful causes exhibit the kind of causation we observe given the CA."

2. Any cause of the universe does not have to be the God of the bible. No reason is given why biblical mythology should be taken any more seriously than any other bronze age mythology.

I already discussed this in my last response to you. The Cosmological Argument indeed, does not indicate the God of the Bible. Rather, we use other arguments to further reveal the aspects of the first cause to determine if we can eliminate other possibilities (this was also done in my last post to you).

In other words, they want to say S1 "and then" S2....3. S1 and S2 follow each other in time

This position is incorrect both in philosophical understanding and in accord with modern physics.

The author has here assumed that the only type of sequencing order possible is a temporal one. That is incorrect, IE a false dichotomy fallacy.

Rather, there are other order sequence types used quite frequently in both physics and philosophy. The relevant one here is logical or causal sequence ordering. We can order a sequence without reference to temporal relationships quite easily. This is a common action within String Theory, the formation and distinction of strings into sub-atomic particles that arises during the initial expansion of the universe occurs absent a temporal reference frame. This action, rather, occurs in one of the "folded" dimensions predicated within String theory that is not part of Minowski space (defined in my last post). So here we can see a physical science arguing for a causal relationship that does not occur in a temporally bound setting.

In philosophy this is known as the question of Immanence.

1.1 Immanence

Question: Are the causal relata immanent, or transcendent? That is, are they concrete and located in spacetime, or abstract and non-spatiotemporal?

This question is connected to the question of category. If the relata are transcendent, then they are facts. If they are immanent, then they are events, or one of the other candidates such as features, tropes, or situations.

In practice, one finds three main arguments on the question of immanence. First, there is the argument from pushing, which maintains that the relata must be immanent so as to push things around. Second, there is the argument from absences, which maintains that the relata must be transcendent so that absences can figure in causal relations. Third, there is the so-called ‘slingshot’ argument, which maintains that the causal relata must be immanent events because (as per an argument from Frege) there is but one transcendent fact: the True.

Pushing: The main argument for immanence is that only immanent entities can interact. This argument is nicely summarized by one of its opponents, Bennett: “Some people have objected that facts are not the sort of item that can cause anything. A fact is a true proposition (they say); it is not something in the world but is rather something about the world, which makes it categorically wrong for the role of a puller and shover and twister and bender.” (1988, p. 22; see also Hausman 1998) According to the pushing argument, only concrete spatiotemporal entities can be causes and effects.

There are two main responses to the pushing argument, the first of which is to find substitute immanent entities. These substitute immanents serve as pushers, and relate to the causal facts, while still being distinct from them. Bennett, in the immediate continuation of the above quote, recruits objects for just such a purpose: “That rests on the mistaken assumption that causal statements must report relations between shovers and forcers. I grant that facts cannot behave like elbows in the ribs, but we know what items do play that role — namely, elbows. In our world the pushing and shoving and forcing are done by things — elementary particles and aggregates of them — and not by any relata of the causal relation.” (1988, p. 22) Mellor (1995) offers a similar response, suggesting facta (the immanent truth-makers for facts) as the immanent basis for fact causation.

The second response to the pushing argument is to charge that it rests on a naive (pre-Humean) conception of causation as requiring some sort of metaphysical push or ‘oomph’. If the causal relation is a mere matter of regularity, why can't the regularities hold between facts?

Absences: The main argument for transcendence is that absences can be involved in causal relations. Absences are said to be transcendent entities. They are nothings, non-occurrences, and hence are not in the world. Thus Mellor says, “For the ‘C’ and ‘E’ in a true causal ‘E because C’ need not assert the existence of particulars. They may deny it… They are negative existential statements, made true by the non-existence of such particulars,…” (1995, p. 132) Here Mellor is arguing that, in the case where rock-climbing Don does not die because he does not fall, Don's non-falling and non-dying are causally related, without there being any events or other immanent entities to relate.

There are two main responses to the absence argument, the first of which is to deny that absences can be causal. In this vein, Armstrong claims: “Omissions and so forth are not part of the real driving force in nature. Every causal situation develops as it does as a result of the presence of positive factors alone.” (1999, p. 177; see also Beebee 2004a) The theorist who denies absence causation may add some conciliatory codicil to the effect that absences stand in cause-like relations. Thus Dowe (2000, 2001) develops an account of ersatz causation (causation) to explain away our intuitions that absences can be genuinely causal.

The second response to the absence argument is to deny that absences are transcendent. One way to do this would be to accept the existence of negative properties, and think of absences as events in which an object instantiates a negative property. Thus Don's instantiating non-falling at t0 might be counted an immanent event, and a cause of the further immanent event of his instantiating non-dying at t1. A second way to deny that absences are transcendent would be to take absence claims as merely a way to describe occurrences, as Hart and Honore recommend: “The corrective here is to realize that negative statements like ‘he did not pull the signal’ are ways of describing the world, just as affirmative statements are, but they describe it by contrast not by comparison as affirmative statements do.” (1985, p. 38) Thus Don's not falling at t0 may be identified with his clinging to the rock at t0, and Don's not dying at t1 may be identified with his surviving at t1, which events are indeed causally related.

Slingshot: Davidson's argument for immanence is the slingshot, which is an argument (from Frege) that there is only one fact, the True. Briefly stated, the argument runs as follows. First, let f1 and f2 be any true facts. Then f1 is logically equivalent to the fact that {x: x=x & f1} = {x: x=x}. Moreover, {x: x=x & f1} is extensionally equivalent to {x: x=x & f2}, and so by substitution f1 is logically equivalent to the fact that {x: x=x & f2} = {x: x=x}. But that is logically equivalent to f2, and so f1 and f2 (our arbitrarily chosen true facts) are logically equivalent. If all facts were indeed logically equivalent, they would, of course, be unsuited for being causal relata. (Davidson 1980b)

The main defense against the slingshot is to block some of its substitution principles (see Mackie 1974, Menzies 1989, and Mellor 1995). One might reject the logical equivalence of f1 with the fact that {x: x=x & f1} = {x: x=x}. Or one might deny that substituting the extensional equivalents {x: x=x & f1} and {x: x=x & f2} inside the context ‘…the fact that…’ preserves logical equivalence.

A more conciliatory version of this defense is to maintain that there is at least one coherent conception of facts shielded from the slingshot (Bennett 1988). That is, one might distinguish between facts1, defined so that the substitutions of the slingshot are valid, and facts2, defined so that at least some of these substitutions are invalid. Then facts conceived of as facts2 may still serve as the relata.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-metaphysics/#Imm

Within quantum mechanics there seems to be real counter examples to the first premise of the argument. "Everything that begins to exist has a cause." For example, when Carbon-14 decays to Carbon-12 the radioactive decay is a perfectly random causeless event and thus though the Carbon-12 began to exist it wasn't caused to exist.

This is a fundamentally untrue claim. The first hint that it isn't being put forth by someone familiar with the process is the claim that Carbon 14 decays to Carbon 12. It doesn't. It decays to Nitrogen 14. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Î’-decay

Further, it completely misunderstands the causes inherent in beta decay. The function is governed at this level by the decay function of a nucleus. This quantum mechanical law is the cause of the decay itself.

What you are doing here (and in your next example) is confusing the fact that we cannot fully predict exactly when it will decay with the idea that there is no cause. There certainly is a cause in quantum mechanics.

Likewise, when matter and antimatter (particle-antiparticle formations) such as electron-positron creation, they can be said to have started to exist but not to have been caused to exist.

This is the more common objection to this point, but has no more objectionary power than the last example. In fact, I already rebutted it earlier:

"In the past, some have sought to object to this premise by forwarding different aspects of Quantum Mechanics. These fail however because the causal mechanism still exists, it is the quantum wave function [2]. The confusion often arises because we confuse a probabilistic cause for no cause at all. If there was a random number generator that killed a cat on odd numbers, we wouldn't say that the cat's death was uncaused."

You'll note that this point already defeats "your" objection of Schroedinger's cat. The random number generator that governs the life/death state of the cat upon observation is still the cause of the cat's death. That it exists in both states prior to observation is irrelevant to that reality.

Dan Barker's article Cosmological Kalamity...reality can be divided into two sets: items that begin to exist (BE), and those that do not (NBE).

Mr. Baker's objection is easily overcome. First, let us define the possibilities a bit more:

1) Thing that began to exist.

2.a) Thing that didn't begin to exist and which do not exist. (which is called an abstract objects)

2.b) Things that didn't begin to exist, but which have always existed. (eternal object)

Hence we can see that the category of "things that do not being to exist" is plural, including both things that are eternal and things that do not exist.

Equivocation:

Your argument also equivocates on the first premise when it refers to everything that "begins to exist". Presumably this premise is referring to everything around us on this planet--everything in your house, everything on the streets, everything we see in the cosmos. However all of these things did not "begin to exist" in the same sense theists are claiming the universe "began to exist" (creation ex nihilo). According to the laws of thermodynamics, matter can neither be created nor destroyed,

The laws of thermodynamics apply within closed systems, like the universe. Meaning that within the universe matter cannot be created or destroyed. They do not apply to open systems necessary for the creation of a universe.

Further the laws of thermodynamics do not begin to function in our universe until the final expansionary phase of the universe during the big bang. Without going into mind numbing detail, as we approach the singularity going back in time, we find that the strong and weak nuclear forces combine to be one force. At that same point the laws of thermodynamics break down. Keep going back and you'll discover that the the electromagnetic force and the Strong/weak force combine. At that point the laws of relativity also break down.

Hence the objection based upon thermodynamics does not apply during the instant of creation. That is true for both the Cosmological Argument, M-Theory, Hawking's Theory and all other attempts to unify Relativity with Quantum Mechanics.

The idea that the universe cannot be created ex-nihilo, while popular with internet atheists is rejected by cosmologists and physicists. All modern theories concerning the origin of the universe, from the multi-verse, M-Theory, Hawking-Hartle, String Theory, etc all consider the origin of matter as ex-nihilo.

Additionally, while the term "universe" is commonly understood to mean "the sum of everything that exists," Kalam represents an attempt to establish the existence of something outside the universe.

This misunderstanding arises from the fact that the Cosmological Argument uses the precise definition of universe rather than the popular notion. In physics and cosmology the universe is not defined as "all things that exist" (which would be a begging the question fallacy for my opponent here), but rather as all matter and energy contained within the boundary of minowski space defined after the big bang.

If this were a legitimate objection, it would cause us to have to reject such physicists as Hawking, Hartle, all String theorists, all cosmologists, etc. I think you wouldn't get much traction with using this objection toward the multiverse theory on a physics forum. Feel free to try and see how well it goes.

There is a further type of equivocation on the phrase "begins to exist". Premise 1 refers to things that begin to exist within time.

Not at all, this objection is rebutted above. It arises from the author's unfamiliarity with causal order systems in both physics and philosophy.

The kalam argument seems to have been worded specifically to address the refutation of the cosmological argument, as it made the qualification that only things that begin have causes.

Given that this version of the Cosmological Argument was written before the refutation he references this seems unlikely.

I think the fact that the author doesn't know that betrays a profound lack of understanding of the argument, which is evident throughout this response.

However, this is a form of special pleading on the part of the theist. As Richard Dawkins put it, the cosmological argument makes "the entirely unwarranted assumption that God himself is immune to the regress." Whether we qualify the first premise to exclude non-beginning things (as the kalam argument does) or not (as the cosmological does), the essential question is why it is more logically defensible to claim that for the rule that everything must have a cause, an exception is made for God but not for the natural universe as a whole?

This is what happens when Biologists such as Dawkins attempt to argue philosophy for which they have no training.

This is not a special pleading fallacy at all. The actual special pleading fallacy relies on the circumstances that the rule is applied to in two cases are the same: http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/special-pleading.html

Here that is clearly not the case.

Circumstance 1: A contingent, temporally finite universe that transitions from a state of ~x (non-existence) to x (existence).

Circumstance 2: A necessary, atemporal being that makes not state transition.

Clearly these are two distinct circumstances and as such it is perfectly valid to apply different rules.

Dawkin's objection can be defeated quite easily with this example.

Lets say I saw a volcanic eruption. That is a state change and requires a causal explanation.

Now lets say I saw a mountain, unchanged during the same period. Would that non-change require a cause?

Of course not, it is a patently silly objection (to steal Dawkin's phrase). If states do no change (as is true for an eternal object) then that change does not need a causal explanation.

In a wider context we can see that he implications of that objection (if accepted) would again serve to shutter String theory, M Theory, Multiverse scenarios, cyclical scenarios and the Hawking-Hartle model. All of these scenarios require a larger universe as well, which would just get us back to regression and the same cosmological question.

If God not having a beginning is not a problem for Craig and other defenders of this argument, why is it a problem for the natural universe?

Besides the objection that actual, temporally subsequent sets cannot be infinite (set theorem), that is the conclusion of all modern cosmologists.

Feel free to reject all of modern cosmology (sine there are currently no physicists that argue the universe is past eternal), but don't accuse us of being anti-science.

P.S. You'll note that I already rebutted this argument in my initial position.

He might say that because we know that everything in the universe needs a cause and that the idea of infinite time is nonsense,

Strawman fallacy. No one has argued that God exists in infinite time (though apparently you do when you argue that the universe does not "begin to exist", showing your position to be internally incoherent). We are arguing that all objects outside of minowski space are atemporal, since they exist outside of the temporal dimension that is part of this universe. This is literally the exact same argument used by Stephen Hawking in the Hawking-Hartle model of expansionary space-time.

In the construction of a house, there may be twenty people involved.

Divisional fallacy. The argument contained within the CA does not state that there is only one entity. Rather that the first cause has certain attributes. That that cause may be subdivided into many elements is irrelevant to it being the first cause.

However, it is more likely than not that the first cause is a singular entity given Occams Razor (which you invoked a few sentences before, but now seem to forget). Given that simpler explanations tend to be true when compared to more complex explanations, we could reasonably prefer a unitary cause to a group of actions composed within a single cause. The latter is not definitionally necessary given the argument and is therefore less likely.

Fallacy of Consumption:

There is no such thing as a fallacy of consumption. The author means a compositional fallacy. It is hard to take the author of this wiki seriously with such obvious mistakes that Dr. Google could solve in a few seconds.

The first premise refers to every "thing," and the second premise treats the "universe as if it were a member of the set of "things." But since a set should not be considered a member of itself, the cosmological argument is comparing apples and oranges.

Mr. Baker is committing an equivocation fallacy here. He is equivocating the definition of universe to definition of "thing." There is no reason to believe that those are identical sets.

For example, if M-Theory is correct, then the set [universe] contains all energy and matter present in minowski spacetime. However, the set [things] contains the set [universe] as well as the set [multi-verse] which contains all other "budding" universes as described within that theory.

The objection that Mr. Baker should raise is that he believes that the set [things] is defined as containing only the set [universe] (which still isn't a compositional fallacy). He would need to support that claim, which he doesn't, and thereby destroy most of modern cosmology which considers the possibility that there are dimensions absent from minowski space-time.

Unfortunately we are stuck inside the universe, so any conclusions we can draw about individual components of the universe (within the set) do not necessarily apply to the set as a whole.

The hidden assumption is that the laws of logic and order are not transcendent (in philosophic terms). That would only be true if the nature of those laws arose as part of the laws of this universe. Since that isn't true (it is irrelevant what universe you are in when you say that there cannot be a married bachelor), this is not a compositional fallacy.

False Dichotomy:

The Cosmological argument does not prove that the cause was a supernatural cause, rather than a natural one. More nature (and natural processes) plausibly exist beyond our current ability to perceive.

Not a false dichotomy fallacy. That fallacy is claiming there are only two options (supernatural and natural) when there are actually more than two.

He is arguing that the argument is not logically sound rather.

That objection fails because I do, in fact, show that the cause must be "supernatural" (defined as, external to this universe) in my opening position:

2) Aphysical and atemporal. Both of these terms mean that the item in question lacks physical and temporal characteristics. Given that both time and space are properties of this universe and that an effect cannot be its own cause (a logical paradox), we see that the cause defined in our conclusion cannot exhibit properties of its own effect. Given that it must be transcendent of this universe (ie it cannot be bound to this universe otherwise it couldn’t exist to elicit the effect) it cannot be limited by the dimensions of this universe.*

IE, the opponent here is claiming (by arguing that the cause could be within our universe) that the universe caused itself, which is internally paradoxical.

Ok, well can you clarify why it couldn't be a FSM?

Because the FSM is simply a renaming of the conclusion and declaring victory. For example, lets say you argued that "the NBA only uses basketballs in their games."

And I countered with, "No they use a magic orb. Where I define that magic orb as a round, inflated ball, approximately 30 inches in diameter."

I would be simply renaming a widely accepted definition in an appeal to ridicule it.

With the FSM, you've simply taken the conclusion of the Cosmological Argument, accepted the characteristics of the cause and then renamed it to something silly to imply that there is a problem with the logic. That has replaced an actual criticism of the premises or the structure directly, that is why it is a fallacy.

My argument has been that there are certain characteristics that are logically necessary from the argument presented. The support you appear to be looking for was given by me earlier in this thread, but if you can't find it let me know I would be happy to re-hash it for you.

Ok, well can you clarify why it couldn't be a FSM?

I think this missed my point. I'm arguing that by simply defining the outcome as FSM, you haven't made a legitimate criticism of the argument.

I could well argue that 1+1=Jellybean if I define Jellybean as: a cardinal integer coming after one. Now normally we all call that two, just as we normally would call an aphysical, atemporal, omnipotent, intentful cause a deity, but you've labelled it as FSM.

The bannana argument you just came up with isn't a good comparison, I know that bannanas exist, Ive seen one, eaten one, held one, smelled one, etc. (as well as many others across the world). God on the other hand I have not seen, smelled, touched, etc.

That isn't really a relevant argument to question something's ontological significance. I have never personally seen a black hole or held one or smelled it, etc. That does not mean that the logical deduction of its existence given modern physics is less compelling.

The argument for its existence (just as the argument for a first cause) is established based upon its internal premises and soundness, not upon our ability to compare it to our personal experience.

The term god impacts an understanding of something that has involvement. It also exemplifies a big understanding on "him." I don't know what it could be; energy, physical form, mythological, etc. Hearing the term god makes you assume an automatic physical being. Either way it's irrelevant, i just acknowledge "something."

Clearly you haven't read any Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas' cosmological argument is based upon the impossibility of an essentially ordered infinite regress. Mine is based upon the observed nature of the universe and the impossibility of a sequentially temporal infinite regress. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmological-argument/#2

I would recommend some reading before wading into this.