I was proposing [in the debate title] "forgiving someone" as the opposite of "holding them accountable". I never meant to make it seem like I thought you equated forgiveness with accountability.

Ah, I misunderstanding then. Apologies.

I thought the dichotomy I presented between "forgiving" and "holding accountable" would have been sufficient. My bad. & I started by presenting what I think are two valid opposites. "Forgiving someone"....as opposed to..."holding someone accountable" If someone wanted to challenge this dichotomy as invalid I would of course welcome that, but I think most people understand being forgiven as being "let off the hook", whether "the hook" refers to assigned personal responsibility or assigned punitive measures is really beside the point. & I didn't ask if people ought to be legally obligated to do what they can to correct injustices they themselves perpetrated, because that (though obvious) isn't what I was getting at. I was hoping to argue that it's actually harmful to let people off the hook (forgive them) compared to holding them responsible for what they do.

Had I been the only one who misunderstood the debate premise I would not question the framing of the debate, but that is not the case. Regardless, we seem to have more or less resolved the confusion and be on the same definitional page... which renders this particular portion of our exchange moot.

I don't think justice is to be sought for it's own sake. We should try to be fair and just because of an underlying concern for health and well-being.

We are in rough agreement then, on this particular at least. I expressed that view as a point of a clarification to your questions regarding my views on justice, not as a rebuttal.

Do you disagree that a person's intent or lack thereof should affect what the legal consequences of their behavior are? If I accidentally harm someone, I certainly do think this should be treated differently than if I harmed them deliberately. You are the one whose thinking is unorthodox if you insist that intent doesn't matter, because moral agency is merely an illusion.

I never claimed to be thinking in an orthodox fashion (rather, using orthodox terminology). I disagree with the way the perception of intent is currently incorporated into the response towards non-pro-social behavior. Presently it is used to warrant a harsher legal consequence, with that consequence generally entailing prison time and/or financial restitution. Because I do not believe that we actually have a willful intent (only a perception thereof), the only way I think "intent" should factor into consideration is with respect to considering the most effective means of social (re)integration. An action conditioned by the perceived experience of intent reflects a different neurological process than does an action absent that condition; the behavior will respond differently to the same corrective attempts. Ultimately, my stance is less against consideration of the perception of intent and more against how it is considered due an over-reliance upon legal retaliation as a form of largely ineffective form of social control. An action qualified by the perception of willful intent should be responded to not inherently with greater severity, but with an eye to efficacy towards the social goal of stability.

I don't assume absolute autonomy or absolute lack thereof (like you seem to in your denial of "free will")

I never said you assumed absolute autonomy, only that autonomy was assumed. This was accurate, given your statement: "Justice is based on the concept of making up for intentionally caused harm." Intention implies at least some degree of autonomy and will. Yet you have not demonstrated the assumption of any degree of autonomy or will to be valid.

Referencing my lack of belief in free will as an "assumption" is not dissimilar from calling agnosticism assumptive. Where there is no proof of a thing, I operate upon the default premise of it's non-existence. In the case of free will, there is actually a growing body of interdisciplinary research that demonstrates the perception of free will to be a neurological delusion (e.g. scientific studies indicating that an action is already set in course before we become aware of "making the decision"). To adopt the perspective with most evidence is to operate from that premise which is most probabilistically true given the knowledge we have.

I don't assume that penalties have to cause harm to anyone (like you seem to).

What penalty exists that does not cause harm to someone? This would negate the very function of a penalty...

Morality for starters

What did I say, exactly, that makes you think I consider morality valid if called by a different name? From the best of my recollection, you attempted to define morality so generally as to render it inclusive of virtually any ideological perspective (including nihilism which rejects the notion of morality). I do not think that is a case of me rejecting something only to embrace it by another name at all.