My response here is the same as my response to the fruit of the poisoned tree discussion below. I refer you there; please let me know if you think this overlooked anything.

You said "People may reason from their moral premise, but so long as their reasoning is premised upon their morality it is fruit of the poisoned tree."

in which I said "I would disagree, I think it is entirely possible to come to moral premises from reason, however, it's just not purely logical because it is compromised by how we think the world should be"

Your point being (if I am not mistaken, as maybe I misunderstood your expression "fruit of the poisoned tree") that if we reason from moral premises then we suffer the consequences of warping how we perceive the reality of things, since our moral frameworks hold no barring on what our reality is. However, my point was that we do not reason FROM moral premises but rather we reason TO moral premises. We come to form our attitudes of what we approve of and disapprove of based off some form of reasoning, we can thus debate the quality of our reasoning from there, despite the fact that our attitudes of approval and disapproval (morality) may not be in any form truth, reality, or knowledge, it can still be reasonable or unreasonable. The problem is when we mistake our morality for truth, reality, and knowledge.

Call it what you like, I do not see that this changes my analysis regarding the distinction between morality specifically and philosophy generally.

All morality really is, are our attitudes of approval and disapproval, it is simply that the overwhelming majority due to insecurities over perceived threats towards their moral frameworks, tend to mistake their attitudes of approval and disapproval as transcendent, and a form of knowledge and truth.

I see that less as an acknowledgement, and more as an assumption. What utility?

It is simply our way of referring to our attitudes of approval and disapproval, of which relates to how we should treat each other, behave around each other, and arguably the back bone behind society and law in general. That is it's utility.

If you are developing a moral system from a basis of reason, then I would contend you are not creating a moral system at all but rather an amoral system of logic to which the term morality is being misapplied.

I disagree, but perhaps that comes down to whether or not moral premises are supposed to, or meant to express truth. The moral nihilist of the error theorist branch would argue that moral premises are meaning to express truth statements but utterly fail to do so, while the non-cognitivist moral nihilist would argue that the language of morality was meant to express attitudes of approval and disapproval and nothing more than that.

It seems a ineffectual and inaccurate practice, to go to the bother of creating a logical framework only to dilute it by communicating it in terms of moral right and wrong.

It is convenient for expressing a schema for what should be encouraged and discouraged.

Further, introducing our emotional preferences for how the world "should" be innately perverts the reasoning process from logic. There is no objective way that anything "should" be; there is only what is.

Well of course how things should be, what should be encouraged and discouraged is ultimately not objective, they are based off desires and intentions, goals and agendas, but they have to be discussed. A civilization in which there are laws that mean to have us co-exist with each other to the point that we thrive together in nature requires establishing a "way things should be". Objectively murder is not right or wrong, it is not true that we should murder or shouldn't murder each other, but it is true that it is counter-productive to the establishment of civilization. While one may be able to argue, that morality isn't necessary in order discuss the necessities for a civilization, what about the necessity for a civilization in and of itself? What about the things that aren't exactly covered by laws, lying, scamming, manipulating, disrespecting each other. It is convenient to have a moral language, a language for what we disapprove of, as it allows us to philosophize on what we should encourage and discourage as a species, and by extension how we can co-exist with each other.

We can apply reason and logic to discuss our emotional preferences; however, we are ultimately not discussing reality or defending reasonable or logical convictions, but rather are attempting to legitimate what are fundamentally illegitimate perceptions of reality.

not defending logical convictions? Here is where I have to disagree, while I concur that when we apply reasoning to our emotional preferences, as you call them, our attitudes of approval and disapproval, we can do so while fully acknowledging that in no way are we discussing the reality of things, but simply that, our attitudes of approval and disapproval. It doesn't have to be an attempt to legitimate any perception of reality. However they can still be logical convictions, valid lines of reasoning as to why I disapprove of this and approve of that, as much as they may be tied to my feelings, and intentions.

The moment that we bend logic to the service of our preferences, we have lost logic as a pursuit and are utilizing it only as a tool; the conclusions we reach in such a process cannot be accurately described as logical themselves, and certainly not as objective.

Yes, they can, if logic is the study of valid reasoning, and if our reasoning as to why we approve of this or disapprove of this is valid, it is definitely logical, and we had not lost the pursuit of logic. granted, these convictions are compromised by feelings and intentions, they can still be logical feelings and intentions.

I think my point stands, however, that morality is not necessary to reach those conclusions. Not only is it unnecessary, I maintain that it encumbers that end by distorting our understanding of objecitve reality in deference to our emotional preferences.

However, you can't reach those conclusions in a purely logical way, or in any way superior to that of the use of moral language. What would be the difference between me expressing what I approve of and disapprove of, through terminology of right and wrong, if I were to acknowledge that in no way does it have any barring on knowledge, reality, truth. ultimately we would be doing the same thing, except I would be doing it within a school of thought specifically meant for it. When you come to a conclusion about what should be encouraged and discouraged, it will be compromised by your feelings, intentions, and everything that comes with your sentience. Nothing objectively should be encouraged or discouraged, the only reason things are encouraged or discouraged is because there are sentient minds that perform such a function, after all it is ultimately logical that they do so.