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Is morality cognitive or non-cognitive?
Moral cognitivism in a nutshell http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitivism_(ethics) Moral non-cognitivism in a nutshell http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-cognitivism
Because moral statements are simply not truth statements, they do not express the truth of something, moral statements are expressions of attitudes of approval and disapproval. If I say murder is immoral, I am expressing an attitude of disapproval towards murder, not the truth about anything.
saying two apples and two apples put together is the same as having four apples is expressing the truth about something, saying murder is immoral is not the truth about anything except your attitude towards murder.
Morality can have truth, but that truth can be dependent on the perception of the individual making it subjective.
Cognitive subjectivist
Morality can have truth that is entirely independent on the perceptions of the individual
cognitive objectivist.
Non-cognitivists simply don't think moral statements express the truth about anything. They are merely expressions of what we approve of or disapprove, as morality are just our attitudes involving approval and disapproval.
How does the cognitive subjectivist not become a contradiction in terms? It necessarily revolves around a subjective internal "truth" which is "true" only insofar as one believes in it, not as a consequence of any objective external reality.
(Source of my confusion, from the non-cognitive link you provided: "A noncognitivist denies the cognitivist claim that 'moral judgments are capable of being objectively true, because they describe some feature of the world.'")
It can't, morality is derived from Fi functions and requires cognition. What he's saying is that, because certain things incite feelings (which doesn't require cognition) in us, that the way that with which we determine it's merit must also by nature be without cognition, which is incorrect...
Can you clarify what you mean by Fi functions or fe ?
No, what I am saying is moral statements don't express truth, to say "X is immoral" is not expressing the truth about anything except what you approve and disapprove of.
Can you clarify what you mean by Fi functions or fe ?
Those acronyms mean "introverted feeling" and "extroverted feeling", respectively. It's from Carl Jung.
No, what I am saying is moral statements don't express truth, to say "X is immoral" is not expressing the truth about anything except what you approve and disapprove of.
Of course they don't, but the reasoning required to form assertions about morality require cognition.
I'm aware that these statements are pointless, but to form such claims you need at least the lowest denominator of cognition. These claims are the result of feelings, but that doesn't mean that weighing these feelings, and using feelings to determine their merit can be done without at least some cognition.
Of course they don't, but the reasoning required to form assertions about morality require cognition.
Ok... Let me try this again... In this specific context...
Cognitive = truth apt
Non-cognitive = not truth apt
The philosophical stance of meta-ethical non-cognitivism is the stance that morality is not truth apt.
The philosophical stance of meta-ethical cognitivism is the stance that morality is truth apt.
Non-cognitivism in this discussion specifically means not truth apt, nothing more and nothing less. Read the links provided in the debate description.
Now that you have said morality is not truth apt, you basically described morality as non-cognitive.
I mean I understand the philosophical controversy of cognition of morality is not commonly heard of, but damn, I'd at least expect people to do a little bit of research...
Cognition is specifically referring to how truth apt something is in this particular case...
You think I mean cognitive by the first definition, NOOOOOO to everyone who has participated in this debate, the first definition.s completely and utterly irrelevant. It's the second definition, that is relevant. Does morality exist in the form of knowledge, are moral statements expressions of truth.
Ok... Let me try this again... In this specific context...
Cognitive = truth apt
Non-cognitive = not truth apt
The philosophical stance of meta-ethical non-cognitivism is the stance that morality is not truth apt.
The philosophical stance of meta-ethical cognitivism is the stance that morality is truth apt.
Non-cognitivism in this discussion specifically means not truth apt, nothing more and nothing less. Read the links provided in the debate description.
Cognition is specifically referring to how truth apt something is in this particular case...
http://i.word.com/idictionary/cognitive
You think I mean cognitive by the first definition, NOOOOOO to everyone who has participated in this debate, the first definition.s completely and utterly irrelevant. It's the second definition, that is relevant.
Yah, sorry. I was using a mobile device when I clicked on your above link, but it said that the page didn't exist for some reason, so I assumed that you were either referring to the conventional of Jungian context of "cognitive".
Now that you have said morality is not truth apt, you basically described morality as non-cognitive.
I have said that the statement that morality is cognitive is troublesome, but that doesn't mean that I believe in the opposite. I neither assert nor deny that morality is truth apt.
I just don't know. I suppose that it could be truth apt, but I place confidence in neither.
Does morality exist in the form of knowledge, are moral statements expressions of truth.
A cognitivist would assert "at least sometimes", and a non-cognitivist would assert "never", I assert nothing pertaining to this.
Yah, sorry. I was using a mobile device when I clicked on your above link, but it said that the page didn't exist for some reason, so I assumed that you were either referring to the conventional of Jungian context of "cognitive".
Well, I was really frustrated the day I made the response that you have just responded to, and I think I may have been unreasonable. It is rather unreasonable of me to expect people to understand what exactly I mean by "cognitive" and "non-cognitive" without clarifying in the debate description, after all, the cognition of morality, is a rather unheard of philosophical controversy.
Of course morality is cognitive in the sense that is of conscious intellectual activity such as reasoning, that is not at all what cognition of morality is, this is a genuine philosophical controversy amongst philosophers. Those who prescribe to non-cognitivism are prescribing to the stance that moral statements are not truth statements, they are not prescribing that morality is not consciously reasoned about.
Cognitivism is the meta-ethical view that ethical sentences express propositions
You, Jung, and I would agree with that, it seems that Jung has also arrived at the same conclusion with Fi vs Fe. However, non cognitivists deny that:
"moral judgments are capable of being objectively true, because they describe some feature of the world."
but somehow seems to paradoxically imply that:
"that moral knowledge is impossible."
Assuming that moral knowledge is impossible, then there shouldn't be any way to know that a moral claim can't objectively true.
Getting back to what cognitivists assert:
ethical sentences express propositions and can therefore be true or false
Of course, this is vague.
I'm not sure if they mean this in an absolute sense (you can't be 100% sure that I'm not a cat), or a practical sense (I typed this with my fingers). If you read further, it seems to take it as if we can handle it as absolutes.
It seems like these two camps are too specific and present a false dichotomy.
You, Jung, and I would agree with that, it seems that Jung has also arrived at the same conclusion with Fi vs Fe. However, non cognitivists deny that:
"moral judgments are capable of being objectively true, because they describe some feature of the world."
but somehow seems to paradoxically imply that:
"that moral knowledge is impossible."
Assuming that moral knowledge is impossible, then there shouldn't be any way to know that a moral claim can't objectively true.
Getting back to what cognitivists assert:
If you define moral knowledge as "justified truth conviction" as plato did, then only statements that express truth can result in expressions of knowledge. If moral stances are not truth based, they can not be knowledge. If "murder is immoral" is not an expression of truth, it cannot express knowledge.
I'm not sure if they mean this in an absolute sense (you can't be 100% sure that I'm not a cat), or a practical sense (I typed this with my fingers). If you read further, it seems to take it as if we can handle it as absolutes.
It seems like these two camps are too specific and present a false dichotomy.
Not vague, it's just that, moral statements are not true nor false, this aligns with the correspondence theory of truth, where truth is supposed to describe the real world. "One should not murder other people" does not at all describe how the real world actually is, to one who defines truth by the correspondence theory, in order for that statement to be true, it would have to be against the laws of physics to murder other people, otherwise what is the statement expressing the truth about other than what you are disapproving of?
More or less, yes. Our morality is shaped by what we value most. It's our (more or less) deliberately developed habits that are proven to aid in the protecting and obtaining of valuables.
I think you have presented a false choice. I think most moral statements are only true under specific circumstances. Some few are true in every situation.
In fact your argument counters the.position it takes it seems.
Maybe it only seems like a fact then?....lol
Are moral statements truth statements?
They are supposed to be. Some are, some aren't
If so, how so?
When a moral statement is true, to behave accordingly will reliably aid in the protecting and obtaining of what the individual or group deems valuable.
I think you have presented a false choice. I think most moral statements are only true under specific circumstances. Some few are true in every situation.
Ok, let me be more precise, non-cognitivism is the idea that moral statements never express true or false propisitions. Where cognitvism is that moral statement can express true or false propisitions.
Maybe it only seems like a fact then?....lol
"Our morality is shaped by what we value most." What we value in no way is an expression of truth, the only truth it expresses is what you value, nothing more.
When a moral statement is true, to behave accordingly will reliably aid in the protecting and obtaining of what the individual or group deems valuable.
When a moral statement is true, to behave accordingly will reliably aid in the protecting and obtaining of what the individual or group deems valuable.
Again, that is not truth... I mean, the nazi's valued certain genes over others, and thus it would be a true statement (according to this) that some people are more inferior to other people.
So we are in agreement that moral statements CAN be true or false, depending on whether they accurately reflect the value system they're supposed to correspond to right?
There are truth claims implicit in any moral statement.
It's assumed! that there are events that impoverish sicken and kill, as opposed to those that enrich, heal, and allow us to flourish and thrive. Moral statements are supposed to reflect truths that help us improve conditions, or at least maintain a certain level of public decency. It's what our justice systems are supposed to be all about. I for one think that seriously immoral people deserve to be locked up. Now I understand...the people I'd like to see locked up are perfectly moral according to their own value system So let me rephrase...I don't want to live in the same community with people whose value systems and morals differ too greatly from mine. I think most people are like this. I wonder how long one can stay stuck asking oneself if anything is truly wrong or right?
Again, that is not truth... I mean, the nazi's valued certain genes over others, and thus it would be a true statement (according to this) that some people are more inferior to other people.
Since YOU brought nazis in to this......
A non-cognitivist would argue that there is no objective way to determine whether the nazis were morally inferior to their opposition right?
So we are in agreement that moral statements CAN be true or false, depending on whether they accurately reflect the value system they're supposed to correspond to right?
Not at all, I do not think any moral statements express truth as they do not at all describe the world but are merely expressions of what you approve of and disapprove of.
There are truth claims implicit in any moral statement.It's assumed! that there are events that impoverish sicken and kill, as opposed to those that enrich, heal, and allow us to flourish and thrive.
Could you explain these statement?
Moral statements are supposed to reflect truths that help us improve conditions, or at least maintain a certain level of public decency.
Better conditions for what exactly? Is it true that we should maintain a certain level of public decency or is that just more approvable?
Now I understand...the people I'd like to see locked up are perfectly moral according to their own value system So let me rephrase...I don't want to live in the same community with people whose value systems and morals differ too greatly from mine.
I was making the point that are values are not at all truths, my point still stands.
A non-cognitivist would argue that there is no objective way to determine whether the nazis were morally inferior to their opposition right?
Objectivity and subjectivity are an entirely different topic that may be strongly intertwined but again still different. If by objective you mean "factual" or "void of bias" I would probably say yes myself. Rather that our expressions of approval and disapproval are not truth, nor knowledge. Now, we can still reason, and even convince each other, however we have to have a certain amount of common ground in order to do so. fortunately as a species we all have some common ground for the most part, majority of us wish to coexist with each other, otherwise there wouldn't be societies, governments, etc.
Not at all, I do not think any moral statements express truth as they do not at all describe the world but are merely expressions of what you approve of and disapprove of.
Earlier you said something like: "the only truth expressed in moral statements is that of individual preference". If we accept that moral statements can truly reflect preference, this means we accept that moral statements CAN be true in at least some sense. Will you agree that all intelligible moral statements are statements about what is valued?
Could you explain these statement?
All "moral statements" are supposedly "good advice". Good is determined by what is valued. If following the advice in question reliably results in attaining/maintaining desirable conditions, then the moral statement is at least somewhat true. For example, if health is your primary value....smoking cigarettes is clearly wrong
I am given to incoherent rambling now and again, but with the "events that impoverish sicken and kill, as opposed to those that enrich, heal, and allow us to flourish and thrive." statement I was thinking of the logical basis of MY morality, and talking like everyone justifies their idea of morality the same way I do...oops!
Better conditions for what exactly?
Better conditions as determined by whoever is in charge :) #problemofauthority
Is it true that we should maintain a certain level of public decency or is that just more approvable?
It is true that setting standards to live by and taking them seriously will produce "approvable" results more consistently than taking a laissez faire approach to habit formation.
I was making the point that are values are not at all truths, my point still stands.
One's values are always based on recognition of more or less "preferred conditions". A description of a value can be true, false or a messy mixture of both. Values are..... held or not held .....NOT.... true or untrue
Morality IS honoring a value system. A moral statement is true, if it amounts to an expression of good advice (ie it helps attain/keep what's valued)
our expressions of approval and disapproval are not truth
They express truths about what we value
I'm just sharing my perspective....not necessarily arguing against your position
Earlier you said something like: "the only truth expressed in moral statements is that of individual preference". If we accept that moral statements can truly reflect preference, this means we accept that moral statements CAN be true in at least some sense. Will you agree that all intelligible moral statements are statements about what is valued?
yes
All "moral statements" are supposedly "good advice".
Personally, I think that's a really neat way of explaining morality in laymans terms.
Good is determined by what is valued. If following the advice in question reliably results in attaining/maintaining desirable conditions, then the moral statement is at least somewhat true. For example, if health is your primary value....smoking cigarettes is clearly wrong
smoking cigarettes would be wrong for improving ones health. I would concur.
I am given to incoherent rambling now and again, but with the "events that impoverish sicken and kill, as opposed to those that enrich, heal, and allow us to flourish and thrive." statement I was thinking of the logical basis of MY morality, and talking like everyone justifies their idea of morality the same way I do...oops!
I am still confused... I was hoping you could articulate your point there, in another way.
It is true that setting standards to live by and taking them seriously will produce "approvable" results more consistently than taking a laissez faire approach to habit formation.
exactly
One's values are always based on recognition of more or less "preferred conditions". A description of a value can be true, false or a messy mixture of both. Values are..... held or not held .....NOT.... true or untrue
What makes a value true or untrue? what truth does a value hold?
Morality IS honoring a value system. A moral statement is true, if it amounts to an expression of good advice (ie it helps attain/keep what's valued)
Again, if I value genetic superiority, then that would make it morally right to enslave and exterminate the genetically inferior, no? After all that is honoring a system of values is it not?
I am still confused... I was hoping you could articulate your point there, in another way.
OK I will. That was pretty bad.
There are truth claims implicit in any moral statement.
Let's start with a common moral statement
"It is wrong to steal"......... Implicit truth claim................ "Stealing is unwise"
I think that works with any moral statement.
What makes a value true or untrue? what truth does a value hold?
Only individual statements can be true or false. Asking what makes a value true or untrue is as bizarre as asking if a sentence fragment is true or untrue. Values are either held or not held, not true or untrue.
if I value genetic superiority, then that would make it morally right to enslave and exterminate the genetically inferior, no?
Only if you value "genetic superiority" over many other possibly overriding values.
After all that is honoring a system of values is it not?
Yes. There are corrupt systems of morals of course.
If I'm understanding this correctly, I'd say definitely this side.
A 'moral' action is one we believe is right. It requires no thought to perform. For a person who could truly be considered moral, they would save another's life, if given the opportunity, with no hesitation, because it'd be as natural as instinct to them, with the idea that what they are doing is right, being hardwired into who they are as a person.
As a counter to a person who's non-cognitively moral, or not really moral because they are doing what's right not because they believe it's right, but because they know it's supposed to be right, is a person who would have to ask themselves before saving a person, if they should or should not. Just as an example.
In short, morality, true morality, requires no thought. It's ingrained into the person, if thought is required it's more than likely not being done sincerely, and I just wouldn't call that morality.
I get the feeling, you don't understand what I mean be cognitive, and non-cognitive. cognition of morality, has to do with how truth apt morality is. A non-cognitivist essentially believes that moral statements are not truth statements. A non-cognitivist believes morality are simply attitudes of approval and disapproval, and what you approve of or disapprove of is not truth.
The implications of this would essentially be that there is no such thing as "moral knowledge", nor is morality a purely logical process.
Knowledge is "justified, truth conviction" since moral statements don't express truth, you do not literally KNOW right from wrong, expressing what you approve of or disapprove of is not an expression of knowledge but merely what you approve of and disapprove of.
It is not ultimately logical to have any particular attitude of approval or disapproval, it is entirely dependent on your emotions, interests, and nature as a human being. The daring psychopath, feels not for any other sentient life, and the only thing that gives his life any meaning, or gives him enough joy to live is killing other people. So this daring psychopath goes on killing sprees because it is the best way for him to live, there is nothing inconsistent in his logic or reasoning, he is just that... a daring psychopath. Now empathetic people, whom wish to co-exist with other people, the logical conclusion of their nature is to oppose this man.
Now non-cognitivism is different from typical moral nihilists, because typical moral nihilism is generally "error theorist". The difference between error theory, and non-cognitivism is this: Error theorists believe all moral statements are automatically false; non-cognitivists believe all moral statements are neither true nor false. What is the difference? Error theorists reject morality in its entirety, they don't describe anything as right or wrong, where non-cognitivists can still describe things as right or wrong, but acknowledge that when they do so, they are just venting there feelings.
As for cognitivism, that is majority of moral philosophy you have heard, beyond moral nihilism. (e.g. moral absolutism, moral relativism, moral realism, etc)
Now non-cognitivism is different from typical moral nihilists, because typical moral nihilism is generally "error theorist". The difference between error theory, and non-cognitivism is this: Error theorists believe all moral statements are automatically false; non-cognitivists believe all moral statements are neither true nor false. What is the difference? Error theorists reject morality in its entirety, they don't describe anything as right or wrong, where non-cognitivists can still describe things as right or wrong, but acknowledge that when they do so, they are just venting there feelings.
In other words, the non-cognitivist recognizes morality as innately subjective but still acknowledges that it exists. I fail to see how this is actually any different than the moral nihilist who sees morality as a human construction and emotional projection, but understands that people obviously still subscribe to it. Is the difference that the non-cognitivist would still subscribe to morality personally or advocate for its utility? Or am I missing some other distinction?
In other words, the non-cognitivist recognizes morality as innately subjective but still acknowledges that it exists.
That way of putting it strangely resonates with me a bit, however a non-cognitivist might argue that moral statements don't express any truth, subjective or objective, if our idea of truth is that of the correspondence theory of truth: "The correspondence theory of truth states that the truth or falsity of a statement is determined only by how it relates to the world and whether it accurately describes (i.e., corresponds with) that world." For example to say the statement "thou shalt not murder" is a true statement, according to this theory, would literally mean it's against the laws of physics to murder people... The statement "You should not kill other people" does not describe the real world in any way, but rather is more of a suggestion to how people should behave in it.
Now the statement "You should not kill other people" could be a true statement in accordance to the correspondence theory of truth if you were to add "...generally speaking, in order to preserve life."
fail to see how this is actually any different than the moral nihilist who sees morality as a human construction and emotional projection, but understands that people obviously still subscribe to it.
Technically non-cognitivism is a form of moral nihilism, it's just that moral nihilism tends to automatically be more associated with what one might call "error theory". That all moral statements are automatically false and thus to say anything is right/moral wrong/immoral is an error (hence the term "error theory").
s the difference that the non-cognitivist would still subscribe to morality personally or advocate for its utility? Or am I missing some other distinction?
Well technically non-cognitivism and error theory are both forms of moral nihilism, where most moral nihilists are typically error theorists (to the point that anyone who claims to be a moral nihilist is usually assumed to be an error theorist, and non-cognitivism is rarely heard of).
edit
A big difference between error theorist moral nihilism and non-cognitivist moral nihilism is that, non-cognitivists can still state things are moral or immoral, but that when they do so, they acknowledge that they are simply venting their feelings and there attitudes of approval and disapproval.
That makes a good deal more sense now. Thank you. It is an interesting approach to considering the matter of morality, and not one I was familiar with before. I think I tend more towards the error theory, in that I tend not to ascribe moral judgement to anything... but I can also appreciate the non-cognitivist perspective quite well. Since the overwhelming majority of people I interact with on a daily basis still subscribe to morality as a legitimate truth and reality, I will at times for conversational expediency still express a moral opinion on a matter while personally knowing it to be a subjective emotional judgement.
Thanks for introducing the subjects and taking the time to explain them. Much appreciated.
I feel the layman's and mainstream take on morality is rather awkward and gives off this vibe that morality is some sort of aura or manifests some sort of real existing attribute to things of which needs to be explained. This definitely seems to hold true when people assert that the existence of morality must indicate a deity's existence to explain where and how morality came from. Moral nihilism has always been appealing to avoid exactly that. However, I think morality serves the purpose of reasoning amongst each other on how we should co-exist, and perhaps that's why we developed it. Non-cognitivism is appealing to me since its a way of discussing moral and immoral, right and wrong while cutting out that "awkwardness".
I appreciate you taking the time to understand my explanation of non-cognitivism.
I think that thoughtlessness of common morality is a leading factor in my rejection of it. Certainly, it has served its evolutionary function as both coping mechanism and behavioral moderator. At the same time, I think it is not the most efficient mechanism to either end. Morality fosters ignorance, if not outright rejection, of reality. Morality has also been used to legitimate and make permissible objectively damaging behavior, probably at least as much as it has prevented it or encouraged objectively constructive behavior. There is nothing to morality dictating that it lead to an objectively better effect than the alternative of its absence; its very subjectivity renders it that way.
The premise of my rejection of morality is not just its innate subjectivity, but its resulting ineffectiveness relative to objective alternatives (e.g. utilitarianism, etc.). Morality strikes me as an evolutionarily necessary evil middleman in behavioral determination. I wonder if there have always been people who have rejected it, or if this is a more recent and/or growing phenomenon; in other words, if there have always been amoral/anti-moral outliers in the human population or if we are evolving away from moralities.
Certainly, it has served its evolutionary function as both coping mechanism and behavioral moderator. At the same time, I think it is not the most efficient mechanism to either end.
I think that the language of morality serves us more good than bad, if we are to recognize it as non-truth apt. It is a convenient means of expressing attitudes of approval and disapproval, and a convenient means of reasoning what is logical to approve and disapprove.
Morality fosters ignorance, if not outright rejection, of reality. Morality has also been used to legitimate and make permissible objectively damaging behavior, probably at least as much as it has prevented it or encouraged objectively constructive behavior.
Well moral platforms are the platforms of which we reason and debate amongst each other, how we should behave, and thus of course people there are going to be people who argue for unhealthy human behavior as moral. It's like philosophy, I could easily argue that philosophy fosters ignorance as well, as many dangerous, and irrational convictions have been made permissible through the use of philosophy, does that however mean we should reject.
There is nothing to morality dictating that it lead to an objectively better effect than the alternative of its absence; its very subjectivity renders it that way.
Same could be said for philosophy, the language of morality is a means to which we converse about how one should act, I think a problem with morality is that people are naturally dogmatic about morality, because our attitudes of approval and disapproval we want to desperately think as truth and knowledge that others only haven't came to have hold because they are more incorrect. The idea that morality doesn't manifest in the form of knowledge, is scary to people, because there isn't a natural moral consensus for all of us to eventually reach, that people can have entirely different ideas of right and wrong, and be just as logical as themselves. It is a threatening to our idea of how things should be. However, we still need to able to reason and even argue over the healthiest ways for us, as a species, to coexist with each other, while recognizing that how we think and feel how people should behave is not knowledge, but attitudes of approval and disapproval.
I think that the language of morality serves us more good than bad, if we are to recognize it as non-truth apt. It is a convenient means of expressing attitudes of approval and disapproval, and a convenient means of reasoning what is logical to approve and disapprove.
How so? Morality is convenient, but this is largely as a consequence of its subjective nature. Morality is not and never has been governed by reason or logic, but is primarily a projection of subjective emotional constructs. To call morality a process of reason and logic is to so utterly alter the meaning of morality as to render the term itself meaningless. At best, one can acknowledge that morality is non-truth apt; this merely informs us, however, that far from indicating what is real in actuality morality instead communicates only what we would like reality to be.
Well moral platforms are the platforms of which we reason and debate amongst each other, how we should behave, and thus of course people there are going to be people who argue for unhealthy human behavior as moral. It's like philosophy, I could easily argue that philosophy fosters ignorance as well, as many dangerous, and irrational convictions have been made permissible through the use of philosophy, does that however mean we should reject.
That moral platforms are the normative basis for advancing arguments does not make them innately preferable or remotely necessary. The difference between morality and philosophy is that all moral systems are innately subjective distortions of reality, whereas not all philosophies must act accordingly. That said, you seem to be presuming that the only alternative to the moral platform is the philosophical narrative. That is fallacious in my opinion.
Same could be said for philosophy [...].
Again, that is not entirely accurate. Certain philosophical schools may establish themselves around objective observation, whereas all moralities are innately subjective projections of emotion judgement.
[...] the language of morality is a means to which we converse about how one should act, I think a problem with morality is that people are naturally dogmatic about morality, because our attitudes of approval and disapproval we want to desperately think as truth and knowledge that others only haven't came to have hold because they are more incorrect. The idea that morality doesn't manifest in the form of knowledge, is scary to people, because there isn't a natural moral consensus for all of us to eventually reach, that people can have entirely different ideas of right and wrong, and be just as logical as themselves. It is a threatening to our idea of how things should be.
I do not disagree with your observations here, except for your reintroduction of morality as a logical process. People may reason from their moral premise, but so long as their reasoning is premised upon their morality it is fruit of the poisoned tree.
However, we still need to able to reason and even argue over the healthiest ways for us, as a species, to coexist with each other, while recognizing that how we think and feel how people should behave is not knowledge, but attitudes of approval and disapproval.
My argument is that morality is not only unnecessary to that process, but damaging to it on account of the subjective assumptions it uses to frame all thought and discussion. If the lens is a distortion of reality, then everything seen through it will be similarly distorted. Better to reject morality entirely, rather than attempting to salvage it through qualification.
How so? Morality is convenient, but this is largely as a consequence of its subjective nature. Morality is not and never has been governed by reason or logic, but is primarily a projection of subjective emotional constructs. To call morality a process of reason and logic is to so utterly alter the meaning of morality as to render the term itself meaningless. At best, one can acknowledge that morality is non-truth apt; this merely informs us, however, that far from indicating what is real in actuality morality instead communicates only what we would like reality to be.
Well although morality is not truth apt, it however can have reason applied to it. It's just not a PURELY logical process. Hybrid theory, the idea that morality is not truth apt, with truth apt features. For example I can have reasoning behind my attitudes of approval and disapproval, but ultimately I will always be expressing only that, my attitudes of approval and disapproval, rather than the truth about anything. For example.
It is immoral to lie because dishonest breaches trust, therefore it is immoral to get somebody else to lie for you. reasoning, for why I disapprove of something.
That moral platforms are the normative basis for advancing arguments does not make them innately preferable or remotely necessary. The difference between morality and philosophy is that all moral systems are innately subjective distortions of reality, whereas not all philosophies must act accordingly. That said, you seem to be presuming that the only alternative to the moral platform is the philosophical narrative. That is fallacious in my opinion.
I think of morality as more of sub branch of philosophy concerning how we should behave amongst each other, or more precisely concerning attitudes of approval and disapproval.
Again, that is not entirely accurate. Certain philosophical schools may establish themselves around objective observation, whereas all moralities are innately subjective projections of emotion judgement.
I can't disagree with you much there, although, in a non-cognitivist view it is acknowledged that emotion forms some basis in morality, however it still have a good amount of utility to it.
I do not disagree with your observations here, except for your reintroduction of morality as a logical process. People may reason from their moral premise, but so long as their reasoning is premised upon their morality it is fruit of the poisoned tree.
I would disagree, I think it is entirely possible to come to moral premises from reason, however, it's just not purely logical because it is compromised by how we think the world should be. However, how we think the world should be, is something we can definitely reason, debate, and discuss.
My argument is that morality is not only unnecessary to that process, but damaging to it on account of the subjective assumptions it uses to frame all thought and discussion. If the lens is a distortion of reality, then everything seen through it will be similarly distorted. Better to reject morality entirely, rather than attempting to salvage it through qualification.
...Or we can recognize that morality does not in any way determine the reality of things, but rather what should be encouraged and discouraged.
Well although morality is not truth apt, it however can have reason applied to it. [...] It is immoral to lie because dishonest breaches trust, therefore it is immoral to get somebody else to lie for you. reasoning, for why I disapprove of something.
My response here is the same as my response to the fruit of the poisoned tree discussion below. I refer you there; please let me know if you think this overlooked anything.
I think of morality as more of sub branch of philosophy concerning how we should behave amongst each other, or more precisely concerning attitudes of approval and disapproval.
Call it what you like, I do not see that this changes my analysis regarding the distinction between morality specifically and philosophy generally.
I can't disagree with you much there, although, in a non-cognitivist view it is acknowledged that emotion forms some basis in morality, however it still have a good amount of utility to it.
I see that less as an acknowledgement, and more as an assumption. What utility?
I would disagree, I think it is entirely possible to come to moral premises from reason, however, it's just not purely logical because it is compromised by how we think the world should be. However, how we think the world should be, is something we can definitely reason, debate, and discuss.
If you are developing a moral system from a basis of reason, then I would contend you are not creating a moral system at all but rather an amoral system of logic to which the term morality is being misapplied. It seems a ineffectual and inaccurate practice, to go to the bother of creating a logical framework only to dilute it by communicating it in terms of moral right and wrong.
Further, introducing our emotional preferences for how the world "should" be innately perverts the reasoning process from logic. There is no objective way that anything "should" be; there is only what is. We can apply reason and logic to discuss our emotional preferences; however, we are ultimately not discussing reality or defending reasonable or logical convictions, but rather are attempting to legitimate what are fundamentally illegitimate perceptions of reality. The moment that we bend logic to the service of our preferences, we have lost logic as a pursuit and are utilizing it only as a tool; the conclusions we reach in such a process cannot be accurately described as logical themselves, and certainly not as objective.
...Or we can recognize that morality does not in any way determine the reality of things, but rather what should be encouraged and discouraged.
I think my point stands, however, that morality is not necessary to reach those conclusions. Not only is it unnecessary, I maintain that it encumbers that end by distorting our understanding of objecitve reality in deference to our emotional preferences.
My response here is the same as my response to the fruit of the poisoned tree discussion below. I refer you there; please let me know if you think this overlooked anything.
You said "People may reason from their moral premise, but so long as their reasoning is premised upon their morality it is fruit of the poisoned tree."
in which I said "I would disagree, I think it is entirely possible to come to moral premises from reason, however, it's just not purely logical because it is compromised by how we think the world should be"
Your point being (if I am not mistaken, as maybe I misunderstood your expression "fruit of the poisoned tree") that if we reason from moral premises then we suffer the consequences of warping how we perceive the reality of things, since our moral frameworks hold no barring on what our reality is. However, my point was that we do not reason FROM moral premises but rather we reason TO moral premises. We come to form our attitudes of what we approve of and disapprove of based off some form of reasoning, we can thus debate the quality of our reasoning from there, despite the fact that our attitudes of approval and disapproval (morality) may not be in any form truth, reality, or knowledge, it can still be reasonable or unreasonable. The problem is when we mistake our morality for truth, reality, and knowledge.
Call it what you like, I do not see that this changes my analysis regarding the distinction between morality specifically and philosophy generally.
All morality really is, are our attitudes of approval and disapproval, it is simply that the overwhelming majority due to insecurities over perceived threats towards their moral frameworks, tend to mistake their attitudes of approval and disapproval as transcendent, and a form of knowledge and truth.
I see that less as an acknowledgement, and more as an assumption. What utility?
It is simply our way of referring to our attitudes of approval and disapproval, of which relates to how we should treat each other, behave around each other, and arguably the back bone behind society and law in general. That is it's utility.
If you are developing a moral system from a basis of reason, then I would contend you are not creating a moral system at all but rather an amoral system of logic to which the term morality is being misapplied.
I disagree, but perhaps that comes down to whether or not moral premises are supposed to, or meant to express truth. The moral nihilist of the error theorist branch would argue that moral premises are meaning to express truth statements but utterly fail to do so, while the non-cognitivist moral nihilist would argue that the language of morality was meant to express attitudes of approval and disapproval and nothing more than that.
It seems a ineffectual and inaccurate practice, to go to the bother of creating a logical framework only to dilute it by communicating it in terms of moral right and wrong.
It is convenient for expressing a schema for what should be encouraged and discouraged.
Further, introducing our emotional preferences for how the world "should" be innately perverts the reasoning process from logic. There is no objective way that anything "should" be; there is only what is.
Well of course how things should be, what should be encouraged and discouraged is ultimately not objective, they are based off desires and intentions, goals and agendas, but they have to be discussed. A civilization in which there are laws that mean to have us co-exist with each other to the point that we thrive together in nature requires establishing a "way things should be". Objectively murder is not right or wrong, it is not true that we should murder or shouldn't murder each other, but it is true that it is counter-productive to the establishment of civilization. While one may be able to argue, that morality isn't necessary in order discuss the necessities for a civilization, what about the necessity for a civilization in and of itself? What about the things that aren't exactly covered by laws, lying, scamming, manipulating, disrespecting each other. It is convenient to have a moral language, a language for what we disapprove of, as it allows us to philosophize on what we should encourage and discourage as a species, and by extension how we can co-exist with each other.
We can apply reason and logic to discuss our emotional preferences; however, we are ultimately not discussing reality or defending reasonable or logical convictions, but rather are attempting to legitimate what are fundamentally illegitimate perceptions of reality.
not defending logical convictions? Here is where I have to disagree, while I concur that when we apply reasoning to our emotional preferences, as you call them, our attitudes of approval and disapproval, we can do so while fully acknowledging that in no way are we discussing the reality of things, but simply that, our attitudes of approval and disapproval. It doesn't have to be an attempt to legitimate any perception of reality. However they can still be logical convictions, valid lines of reasoning as to why I disapprove of this and approve of that, as much as they may be tied to my feelings, and intentions.
The moment that we bend logic to the service of our preferences, we have lost logic as a pursuit and are utilizing it only as a tool; the conclusions we reach in such a process cannot be accurately described as logical themselves, and certainly not as objective.
Yes, they can, if logic is the study of valid reasoning, and if our reasoning as to why we approve of this or disapprove of this is valid, it is definitely logical, and we had not lost the pursuit of logic. granted, these convictions are compromised by feelings and intentions, they can still be logical feelings and intentions.
I think my point stands, however, that morality is not necessary to reach those conclusions. Not only is it unnecessary, I maintain that it encumbers that end by distorting our understanding of objecitve reality in deference to our emotional preferences.
However, you can't reach those conclusions in a purely logical way, or in any way superior to that of the use of moral language. What would be the difference between me expressing what I approve of and disapprove of, through terminology of right and wrong, if I were to acknowledge that in no way does it have any barring on knowledge, reality, truth. ultimately we would be doing the same thing, except I would be doing it within a school of thought specifically meant for it. When you come to a conclusion about what should be encouraged and discouraged, it will be compromised by your feelings, intentions, and everything that comes with your sentience. Nothing objectively should be encouraged or discouraged, the only reason things are encouraged or discouraged is because there are sentient minds that perform such a function, after all it is ultimately logical that they do so.
Regarding the premise of morality - reasoned from or reasoned towards. ("You said [...] schema for what should be encouraged and discouraged.")
The problem is that morality is not an attitude of or reference to (dis)approval, but rather a process of legitimating that (dis)approval to others. This is problematic because morality is fundamentally a system of emotionally compelled assumptions, not of reason and logic. If we truly reasoned our way to morality, then moral systems would not be so consistently and extensively fraught with internal inconsistencies and outright contradictions with objective reality. If you ask almost anyone who adheres to a moral system to defend their morality with reason, it inevitably breaks down to the assertion of the thing - it's wrong, it's right, it just is!. With morality, the ultimate premise is always assertion; whatever is reasoned from there is still fundamentally a product of subjective emotional assumption.
That morality is so easily threatened speaks to its assertive, assumptive nature. If we reasoned to morality rather than from it, then there would be no need for the knee-jerk defensiveness of individual moral claims. However, because the moral system is itself an assumption the deligitimation of any of its individual assertions undermines the perceived integrity of the whole system. If one assertion is revealed as the assumption it is, then the entire moral system becomes undermined. If morality were something we reasoned our way to, then this simply would not be the case. The individual moral claim could be disproved without in any way necessarily undermining the entire system.
The social utility of morality. ("Well of course how things should be [...] co-exist with each other.")
Morality functions as a social lubricant. My argument is not that this is not the case, but rather that it is not most efficient possible mechanism for the regulation of interpersonal behavior.
What is discouraged and encouraged need not fundamentally be a product of subjective derivation. Social ordering is presently dependent upon moral legitimation not because morality is fundamental to social ordering, but because the present social order was built upon morality. Moral language seems convenient because we exist in a predominantly morally ordered society, not because it is actually the most efficient approach. Were we actually capable of abandoning morality as a species, we could adopt a new language for discussing our behavior; rather than doing something because it is subjectively right, we would do it because it is objectively better. Behavior could still be enforced interpersonally, but it would be legitimated primarily by objective rationalization rather than subjective moral assumption.
not defending logical convictions? [...] However they can still be logical convictions, valid lines of reasoning as to why I disapprove of this and approve of that, as much as they may be tied to my feelings, and intentions.
If we are not using morality to discuss actual reality, then that speaks to its limited utility. If our reasoning as to what we (dis)approve of is premised upon a view that is non-contingent upon and even contradictory to reality, then that (dis)approval is itself fallible. We can (dis)approve of things independent of morality, and my argument is that doing so produces a more consistently efficient social engineering mechanism.
Yes, they can, if logic is the study of valid reasoning, and if our reasoning as to why we approve of this or disapprove of this is valid, it is definitely logical, and we had not lost the pursuit of logic. granted, these convictions are compromised by feelings and intentions, they can still be logical feelings and intentions.
By definition, logic is a process of reasoning that is valid. At that point where a line of reasoning is premised upon an assumption divorced from and even inconsistent with reality, I would contend that it is not valid and thus is not logical.
However, you can't reach those conclusions in a purely logical way, or in any way superior to that of the use of moral language. [...] Nothing objectively should be encouraged or discouraged, the only reason things are encouraged or discouraged is because there are sentient minds that perform such a function, after all it is ultimately logical that they do so.
I have never claimed that an amoral approach would be purely objective or logical. Rather it would be significantly more objective than the innately subjective system of moral assumption. The language of moral judgement did not develop solely to describe human behavior and its regulation, nor is it the only semantic system capable of doing so. The very problem with moral language is that it does more than describe, it ascribes; it attaches abstract and subjective judgement and value to the description, an embellishment which removes it from objective reality. This in turn makes the description prejudiced towards stagnation; it need not be influenced by reality because it is not dependent upon it (indeed, reality can itself be anathema to moral perception).
Sentience need not be morally inclined (mine is not), nor need the conduct of a sentient being be comported primarily along the lines of moral sentiment (mine is not). Sentience is nothing more than self-awareness; we can be aware without being moral. Nor is the moral "should" necessary to the process of interpersonal behavior regulation.
Yes that did go straight over my head. I had never heard the word cognitive used outside brain functions so I had to google it to be sure. I got basically "to use thought" and ran with it. oops
No worries, I knew the cognition of morality is something that very few people have heard of, so it is actually rather silly of me to assume people would immediately know that the term "cognition" is a philosophical term of significance. So I apologize.
In summary, the question of whether morality is cognitive or non-cognitive lacks a definitive answer and continues to be explored and debated by philosophers and ethicists. Different theories offer distinct explanations regarding the nature of moral judgments and the underlying cognitive or non-cognitive processes involved. bath remodeling contractors desoto tx