CreateDebate is a social debate community built around ideas, discussion and democracy.
If this is your first time checking out a debate, here are some quick tips to help get you started:
Arguments with the highest score are displayed first.
Argument replies (both in favor and in opposition) are displayed below the original argument.
To follow along, you may find it helpful to show and hide the replies displayed below each argument.
To vote for an argument, use these icons:
You have the power to cast exactly one vote (either up or down) for each argument.
Once you vote, the icon will become grayed out and the argument's score will change.
Yes, you can change your vote.
Debate scores, side scores and tag scores are automatically calculated by an algorithm that primarily takes argument scores into account.
All scores are updated in real-time.
To learn more about the CreateDebate scoring system, check out the FAQ.
When you are ready to voice your opinion, use the Add Argument button to create an argument.
If you would like to address an existing argument, use the Support and Dispute link within that argument to create a new reply.
A utilitarian philosophy can applied to any aim, moral or not. Utilitarianism does not provide the aim. I think egoism and utilitarianism are compatible. A utilitarian egoist simply looks for the most efficient way to achieve their goals. That's me (and I think most people).
Utilitarianism identifies the greatest good as the ultimate ends of any right action. I see absolutely no way of construing that to conclude that it does not provide the aim, as it does so quite explicitly: the greater good. All other ends are subservient to that ultimate utilitarian end, including the interest of the individual the sacrifice of which may not only be permissible but morally requisite. To argue that egoism best fulfills utilitarianism is to subsume utilitarianism under egoism and render it moot (i.e. if utilitarianism cannot operate as an independent philosophy then it lacks logical integrity).
If one seeks the most efficient means to achieving their personal objectives, then the greater good can only ever be a secondary motive and never an end unto itself. The concept of a utilitarian egoist is a contradictory attempt at an unnecessary reconciliation of ends.
Utilitarianism identifies the greatest good as the ultimate ends of any right action. I see absolutely no way of construing that to conclude that it does not provide the aim, as it does so quite explicitly: the greater good.
Since people's ideas of what types of behavior serve " the greater good" differ so much, I hardly think it's specific enough for a utilitarian approach.
All other ends are subservient to that ultimate utilitarian end, including the interest of the individual the sacrifice of which may not only be permissible but morally requisite.
I will grant that categorically, all Utilitarians make decisions based on what they think will help bring about or preserve "desirable conditions".
To argue that egoism best fulfills utilitarianism is to subsume utilitarianism under egoism and render it moot
Who can act but in their own interest? Even those who attempt to serve the greater good as they imagine it, do so because it suits their fancy.
(i.e. if utilitarianism cannot operate as an independent philosophy then it lacks logical integrity).
Were one to say "my aim is to serve the greater good" this only begs the question, it tells nothing of what they intend to accomplish. Knowing what one intends to accomplish (specifically) is required for a utilitarian approach.
If one seeks the most efficient means to achieving their personal objectives, then the greater good can only ever be a secondary motive and never an end unto itself. The concept of a utilitarian egoist is a contradictory attempt at an unnecessary reconciliation of ends.
I know of no reason that a utilitarian cannot believe that "the greater good" is served by tending first to our own well-being .
Since people's ideas of what types of behavior serve " the greater good" differ so much, I hardly think it's specific enough for a utilitarian approach.
Neither ambiguity nor relativity alters the fact that utilitarianism still presents the greater good as the end objective (although it arguably demonstrates its invalidity). Moreover, the same argument could be made against any end so to follow your argument to its natural implication would be to conclude that there can be no ends.
I will grant that categorically, all Utilitarians make decisions based on what they think will help bring about or preserve "desirable conditions".
Including the sacrifice of the individual, which is fundamentally antithetical to egoism rendering the suggested integration of the two philosophies impossible.
Who can act but in their own interest? Even those who attempt to serve the greater good as they imagine it, do so because it suits their fancy.
This does not mean that egoism serves utilitarianism. More accurately, it identifies a fundamental descriptive flaw in utilitarianism; this undermines utilitarianism, but more importantly it means that to make egoism a means to utilitarianism is to dilute and corrupt the former in a vain attempt to salvage the latter.
I would further suggest that the preferential disposition towards utilitarianism derives from the erroneous notion that altruism precedes self-interest, whereas the opposite is actually the case. The implication being that if utilitarianism has any remaining value it is as a means to egoism (rather than your reverse proposal).
Were one to say "my aim is to serve the greater good" this only begs the question, it tells nothing of what they intend to accomplish. Knowing what one intends to accomplish (specifically) is required for a utilitarian approach.
The assertion that the greater good is not only a value but the ultimate value is begging the question. Lack of specificity is not because it no way assume the validity of anything (it just renders it impractical). There is also a distinction between applied utilitarianism and conceptual utilitarianism, with your argument having no particular bearing upon the latter.
This also misses my point regarding the subjugation of egoism to utilitarianism as being inherently contradictory to utilitarianism and self-defeating to your proposed reconciliation of the two philosophies.
I know of no reason that a utilitarian cannot believe that "the greater good" is served by tending first to our own well-being .
Any attempted integration of utilitarianism and egoism must inherently situate one as secondary to the other; to argue otherwise is to assume against empirical reality that the two ends will never come into conflict with one another. The problem with your proposed integration is that it inherently situates egoism as subservient to utilitarianism, the latter being a logically unsound framework (following from your own observations even) which begs the question of its very premise.
To relegate egoism as secondary is also fundamentally antithetical to what egoism stands for: the primacy of the individual self-interest over all other concerns.
I never said anything about egoism serving utilitarianism. It is utilitarianism that serves however narrow or broad an interest someone may have.
The reason I think egoism and utilitarianism are compatible is that when someone sets out to work towards some imagined "greater good" they always do this out of self interest.
to follow your argument to its natural implication would be to conclude that there can be no ends.
Rather, the "end", "aim", or goal that utilitarianism (as I understand it) requires must be specific. You can't just say "I want to do better", or "I work for the greater good". Without clear and specific goals in mind, one can't be utilitarian.
More accurately, it identifies a fundamental descriptive flaw in utilitarianism; this undermines utilitarianism
It undermines the more poorly thought out versions commonly discussed in philosophy classes.
I never said anything about egoism serving utilitarianism.
That was my misunderstanding; apologies.
It is utilitarianism that serves however narrow or broad an interest someone may have. & The reason I think egoism and utilitarianism are compatible is that when someone sets out to work towards some imagined "greater good" they always do this out of self interest.
If one seeks first to fulfill their self interest then they are not actually pursuing the greater good, rendering the pursuit categorically antithetical to utilitarianism. That people generally cannot remove themselves from their attempts at the utilitarian calculus is indicative of a practical and descriptive shortcoming of the philosophy, not a basis from which to conclude that it is part of the egoist pursuit. Utilitarianism is fundamentally an ordinal system of valuation which asserts the greatest aggregate good as the primary end. To suggest that something could still be utilitarian which does not satisfy that conception is, I think, to stretch the term beyond meaningfulness.
For all that an egoist may engage in cost-benefit or optimization calculus, it is the individualized nature of this calculus which differentiates it from the utilitarian calculus which considers foremost the good in aggregate (the "greater"). They are not compatible ideologies, because the subservience of either one to the other is antithetical to their respective premises. Egoism places the individual interest first and utilitarianism the collective interest first; subsuming one to the other negates the subsumed philosophy.
If one seeks first to fulfill their self interest then they are not actually pursuing the greater good
One might think that...One might also think that it's impossible to effectively pursue any "greater good" without tending first to one's own interests and/or well being. I think what you are presenting is a false choice dilemma.
I have explained at greater length already why the two are incompatible as equal ends, but in short it is inconceivable that the two would never come into conflict. In any instance where they do to resolve towards one or the other is necessarily to render one a means to the other, therefore contradicting the premise intrinsic to the subsumed philosophy. If your argument is to hold any actual merit, you must present a reason to think that the two are always complimentary without any exception.
The only case where egoism is equivalent to utilitarianism is if the moral agent is indifferent between his or her own good and the good of every other moral being that exists or ever will exist. Now this makes me ask some questions: Are we capable of such indifference? Should the egoist hold the values and beliefs that would lead them to this indifference? What is good anyway? Pleasure? Utility? Enlightenment? Or does each have his own subjective good? Then should the utilitarian try to realize their perception of someone else's good or should they try to realize the other person's perception of their own good?
If you are a utilitarian and believe in psychological hedonism (which I have learned recently from my reading of Sidwick that this had been refuted in psychological and philosophical circles, or at least they thought they did in the late 19th century, I have yet to see a convincing argument), you must believe that this indifference is possible and should be attained. I find this concept poetic but is it reasonable? I am not sure.
What you describe as indifference I shall refer to as dominant altruism, a disposition wherein one places the non-selfish good before their selfish good. I would argue that simple neutrality alone does not adequately meet the demands of utilitarianism, which at time necessarily demand that an individual be sacrificed for the greater good.
I think a egoistic dominant altruist is an oxymoron. The only way in which an egoist could view dominant altruism and still be an egoist is if they perceived such dominant altruism as being most in their self-interest than any other alternative; because the reference point is still back to egoistic self-interest then dominant altruism is the not the primary determinant and so utilitarianism is not the primary end. That the utilitarian end is accomplished is incidental to an unlikely, and potentially impossible, manifestation of egoism; it is not the consequence of a reconciliation of the two philosophies which holds their two ends as equal.
Moreover, even assuming the egoistic dominant altruist exists they cannot legitimately be said to constitute a significant portion of the practicing egoist body (let alone its majority). So long as egoism produces even one person who is not also a dominant altruist, then the egoistic paradigm will still be given preference over the utilitarian paradigm by that person in accordance with the egoistic philosophy. The implication is that core premise of utilitarianism is still subservient to the core premise of egoism, thus invalidating the former under my earlier argumentation.
As to what an egoist "should" want the only proscription of egoism is that that they should want what they want. No further reasoning or justification is required, and arguably none would be valid unless viewed as dependently valuable upon the premise of egoism. This is, in my view, a virtue which egoism holds over utilitarianism: egoism does not need to ascertain what constitutes a greater good, and therefore need not establish any hierarchy of preferences (pleasure, enlightenment, etc.) in order to weigh the merits of divergent conceptions of that greater good.
RE P1: Our behaviors are determined by our biological dispositions as conditioned by our lived experiences. These factors influence our perceptions of our self-interests, which may or may not align with our objective self-interests (if such objective self-interest even exists). I also do not think that in all cases an individual will behave predominantly out of self-interest, and maintain that they may even intend to act against it.
RE P2: Our idea of what constitutes the greater good is a subjective view fundamentally prejudiced by our perceived self-interest. This may diverge from what actually constitutes the greater good (again, if such an objective good even exists).
That's begging the question indeed as far as I see egoism as a joke (and right wing politics equally as a joke as it's literally egoism as an economic policy).
While I'm no selfless pushover nor a left-wing nutjob but it's simple really. if most people are happy, least people are unhappy. There is no argument against this. :)
Your blatant disregard for logic, disinterest in actually engaging contrasting viewpoints, and unwillingness to substantiate your claims when requested indicate that you are not interested in contributing substantively to actual dialogue. You are therefore banned from this thread.
Utilitarianism is the more logically valid philosophy. All of reality's life forms are equal, meaning that life's meaning (or reality's final point) has to include the whole quantity of reality's consciousness..
Thus, egoism is inherently unable to overrule utilitarianism (the latter being about the whole quantity, and the former being the converse).
You are confusing utilitarianism for egalitarianism. The utilitarian pursues holds as good that which produces the greatest good. This is no way means that it preferences actions which are equally good for everyone, and in fact frequently legitimates and even demands that people be treated unequally or that individuals be sacrificed to the greater good.
By contrast, egoism holds every person's self-interest as equally valid and merits all assertions of self-interest equally to one another. So, by your own standard, egoism would actually be more egalitarian the utilitarianism would.
Moreover, why should we even care about egalitarianism? You assert that all life is equal, that life has meaning, and that "reality" has a consciousness... but you never present any rationale as to why we should think any of this is true.
People can and do expect free housing, and in some circumstances they even receive it. Perhaps it could be argued that for all people expecting something to happen does not mean that it will happen. But that very specific instance of case equality does not make people fundamentally equal in the more general sense in which we are speaking.
What does that even mean, "they get referenced"? Not that winning this point wins you the debate, for the reason already provided which you have failed to address.
Claiming that all people are equal does not make it true. There are plenty of arguments against this claim, the most obvious and compelling being reality. A more complex argument involving philosophies such as nihilism or egoism, perhaps.
Yet not all humans will be spoken of equally. More importantly, as I have already argued, demonstrating one particular instance in which people may be equal does not demonstrate that people are equal in general. That is another point you have utterly neglected to address.
A basic, common state of existence is shared between humans and literally everything else that exists. By your reasoning then a rock should have the same entitlements as a human being. I wonder if that is your view?
I do also maintain that this is still a very narrow and constrained understanding of "equal", but you seem disinterested in engaging with that objection. Indeed, you seem done with this debate and I am inclined to feel similarly.
Egoism is more logically valid as it is essential in evolution (survival). However, psychological egoism complements egoism in way that renders egoism inescapable. Everything you do is purely based on self-interest. There is no such thing as an altruistic act. One may believe one is acting altruistically, but there are subliminal psychological functions that cause you to act non-selflessly- even in the most extreme cases such as heroic acts of suicide.
NOTE: I might also add that you edit the utilitarian description by appending 'for the greatest amount of people'. One can easily misinterpret the 'greatest good' as being a good that is personal.
I very deliberately did not include the phraseology "for the greatest amount of people" because this opinion is not endorsed by all utilitarian philosophers, including some of its most prominent advocates. John Stuart Mills, for instance, argued that it may be possible for an action to create more aggregate good by benefiting one person than alternative could create by benefiting five people; in other words the one person experiences 60 unites of "good" and the group experiences only 50 units together.
Your argument seems to presuppose that fulfilling evolution has value, sometimes referred to as the naturalist fallacy. It also presupposes the inherent necessity of self-interest (and thus preclusion of pure altruism) as an evolved attribute, on the apparent basis of previous and contemporaneous human psychology.
There are apparent cases of pure altruism, particular with respect to cases of fatal altruism ("heroic suicide"). Evolution arguably has selected for pure altruism with regards to family, and in particular progeny; the disposition itself securing a greater chance for continued procreation of the line. I think a similar argument might be extended to generalized fatal altruism. One may argue as you have that fatal altruism is ultimately satisfies a personally perceived need/desire towards fatal altruism, but I think that perceived satisfaction of self-interest has to be taken in balance with the actual satisfaction of self-interest (the latter being decidedly compromised). I think the repercussions of egoism are also more interesting in this light: the implication being not only that fatal altruism is counter-intuitive but even morally wrong. In short, I do not think it is necessary to repudiate the existence of possible pure altruism in order to reject it as a moral/ethical/philosophical premise.
(P.S. If it is unclear, I do endorse egoism myself... albeit from a different basis.)
I am arguing that egoism is a necessity in evolution. I am not arguing that it is an evolved attribute, rather it is inextricably attached to the evolutionary process. Herbert Spencer, a psychological egoist, argued that humans and animals primarily seek to survive and protect their lineage. Essentially, the need for the individual and for the individual's immediate family to live supersedes the others' need to live. All species attempt to maximize their own chances of survival and, therefore, well being. Spencer asserted the best adapted creatures will have their pleasure levels outweigh their pain levels in their environments. Thus, pleasure meant an animal or human was fulfilling its egoist goal of self survival, and pleasure would always be pursued because species constantly strive for survival.
Altruism
People are only motivated by self-interest. There are subliminal forces operating on one's psyche such that if one were to not complete this genetically advantageous heroic act that is altruistic suicide, such an action, or lack thereof, would be followed with compunction (sooner or later) for a multitude of reasons- thereby maintaining psychological egoism.
You must also consider duress. One may feel as though one has no choice but to complete the supposed altruistic act (for example, in the case of suicide bombing, or even someone jumping on a grenade-the former most certainly is an egoistic act as it may be done for admiration or potential afterlife rewards (e.g., 72 virgins); the latter is more exemplary of duress, which most argue that duress is not a valid form of consent). Essentially, in order for suicide to be altruistic, it must be consensual; the suicides in question--the ones to which you are referring--are not consensual (as they are made under duress); therefore, they are not altruistic.
Natural selection favors those attributes which confer the greatest advantage to the perpetuity of the genetics which predispose to those attributes. While this commonly preferences a strong bias towards self-interest, it is also the basis for altruism as I explained at greater length earlier and will go into greater depth with below.
Altruism
I think that most cases of purported altruism as ultimately self-interested, even including some cases of fatal altruism. However, this does not discredit cases of fatal altruism which are not explained by belief of reward or penalty in an afterlife. Again, I think that cases of fatal altruism by parents for children are something of an insurmountable objection to your argument. While projected guilt-based duress may factor, I think it is disingenuous to assume that it can account for all situations (particularly where evidence to that effect is lacking in psychological literature). This is particularly true when we have a basis from which to conclude that pure fatal altruism might actually confer an evolutionary advantage, per my earlier argumentation.
Additionally, even while fatal altruism might satisfy some coercive emotional self-interest I find it hard to not hold that on balance with the self-interest which is not served by the act (i.e. death of self, with all self-interest deriving from the existence of self). Upon what basis might one hold self-interest as being satisfied if on balance it is harmed? Notably, and by contrast, the altruistic end is arguably satisfied on balance.
There seem only two possible explanations for people to engage in an action which is on balance detrimental to their self-interest: they are dysfunctionally maladaptive towards fulfilling self-interest or there is sometimes a superseding ends to self-interest. The former strikes me as a less likely evolutionary development than the latter.
If I was not clear, I was not suggesting that the duress resulted from an evolutionary basis; my point was that feeling as though one has no choice but to kill oneself cannot be deemed altruistic. This holds true in cases even when one believes it is one's duty to kill oneself.
Fatal Altruism (Parental)
A mother refusing to eat food that will prolong her survival so that her kids can eat, and therefore dying as a result, is an evolutionary mechanism for genetic preservation; but, I contend, that this is not exemplary of selflessness. The mother is manifesting, albeit subconsciously, the evolutionary premise of, "I want myself--genes--to live on, and to do so, I must sacrifice myself." Her offspring, whom she is preserving, are apart of her, and thus sacrificing her life for their survival is, paradoxically, self-interested.
You are still conflating the counterargument I am making with a representation of your argument which I am not making. I understand your point that when one feels that they are duty bound or otherwise required to engage in fatal altruism that this does not actually constitute altruistic acting. My counterpoint is that behavioral concession to duress represents a subjugation of the self interest to the expectations of the other. Regardless of how coercive or manipulative that claim upon the individual is, they nevertheless are seen to be disposed to accept the claim upon themselves rather than asserting themselves above it. My contention is that people are, to varying degrees, genetically disposed to accept the claim of the other over the claim of their self and that this disposition constitutes the altruistic instinct.
Fatal Altruism (Parental)
Again, I maintain that the compelling disposition to erroneously believe that the independent offspring are an extension of the finite self constitutes the evolutionary mechanism of altruism. It is the means by which evolution bypasses the self-interest, by confusing the self-interested instinct to act against itself. That the parent perceives their fatal altruism in a selfish manner does not mean that their sacrifice is actually selfless; rather, it indicates that they have been tricked by natural selection to conflate the other for the self in order that their disposition might favor such sacrifice.
I would like to know: what is self-interest? Is selfishness? That would mean empathy would be a sin. Should I do what's best for me in the long run or give in to my appetites and passions? It seems to me that concern for my future self is a type of empathy that I could learn to ignore.
There is also the question of what should be my self-interest. If I am an egoist and I believe that blowing myself up for will lead to an eternity in paradise and this turns out to be with wrong, have I sinned? Perhaps I should try to realize my "real" self-interest instead of my perceived self-interest, that is, I should do whatever has the actual consequences that I most prefer the most not just do whatever I think has the best consequences.
There is still the question of what consequences I should want for myself. Aristotle said that the rational and hence virtuous life is the happiest life, should I want the happiest life? Perhaps I should want the examined life. Or maybe I should want self overcoming. Should I want to bring happiness to others?
To answer the question, I believe that egoism is less valid because it is more complicated. Instead of a single good you have billions of goods that many times contradict one another. In such a system a large number of actions are both good and bad. This seems to undermine the whole point of a moral system. Instead of egoism you should simply reject the idea of morals.
I would like to know: what is self-interest? Is selfishness?
Self-interest and selfishness have distinct meanings. Here is an example:
Self-interest: I earn $12,000,000,000: I earn this money based on a $100K loan that I received from my family (11,999,900% increase). I share 20% (2,400,000,000) of my newly found wealth with my family.
Selfishness: I earn the same amount, pay back the $100K loan to my family, and keep the rest to myself.
Selfless: I equally distribute the newly found wealth among my family.
There is also the question of what should be my self-interest.
There are no moral guidelines as to what your self-interest should include. However, there are variations within this philosophical concept (e.g., normative egoism, rational egoism, psychological egoism, etc.).
Perhaps I should try to realize my "real" self-interest instead of my perceived self-interest, that is, I should do whatever has the actual consequences that I most prefer the most not just do whatever I think has the best consequences.
This presupposes the ability of prognostication. Given that we are governed by our beliefs, we have no choice but to act in a way that may not produced the desired consequences.
There is still the question of what consequences I should want for myself. Aristotle said that the rational and hence virtuous life is the happiest life, should I want the happiest life? Perhaps I should want the examined life. Or maybe I should want self overcoming. Should I want to bring happiness to others?
His philosophy is highly fallible. For example, if I pretend to be brave while doing a dangerous act: even though I did the dangerous, thus having the intended consequences (perhaps appraisal), I am not a virtuous person. The problem with this is that, although I am not a virtuous person, I still received the desired consequences and thus happy as a result.
I might also add that 'virtuousness' is subjective, but through his philosophy lies a list of imperatives.
To answer the question, I believe that egoism is less valid because it is more complicated. Instead of a single good you have billions of goods that many times contradict one another. In such a system a large number of actions are both good and bad. This seems to undermine the whole point of a moral system. Instead of egoism you should simply reject the idea of morals.
You are over-complicating it. It simply suggests that either: (1) one should only act out of self-interest; or (2) that one is purely motivated by self-interest. (But again, these are the two most popular variations of egoism, there are still a few more).
I would like to know: what is self-interest? Is selfishness? That would mean empathy would be a sin.
Although self-interest is fundamentally selfish this does not mean that empathy is therefore "sinful" or otherwise problematic. If one experiences empathy as an enrichment to their life then there is no reason it should be wrong. The only instance in which empathy would be an issue is if it were permitted to supersede the self-interest.
Should I do what's best for me in the long run or give in to my appetites and passions? It seems to me that concern for my future self is a type of empathy that I could learn to ignore.
Egoism dictates neither short- nor long-term deliberation, and of course the two are not mutually exclusive. Arguably, there is no single answer; whichever appeals more to the perceived self-interest of the individual would be the presumably better option.
There is also the question of what should be my self-interest.[...] Perhaps I should try to realize my "real" self-interest instead of my perceived self-interest [...].
The only thing we can operate upon are our perceptions, so the question is moot. This is, of course, as true of utilitarianism as it is of egoism; the fundamental difference being that egoism preferences individual perception over collective perception.
There is still the question of what consequences I should want for myself.
Again, I think that under egoism there is no single or absolute answer to this question. Whatever one perceives as being the most self-fulfilling is the better option. There is no "should" beyond the self-perceived interest; one may want what they want without needing to justify it further than that.
To answer the question, I believe that egoism is less valid because it is more complicated. Instead of a single good you have billions of goods that many times contradict one another. In such a system a large number of actions are both good and bad.
Utilitarianism is no less complicated because there is no single conception of what constitutes the "greater good". There are as many possible different and contradicting notions of utilitarian good as there are egoistic good, because both types are equally determined by individuals. It is therefore equally true of utilitarianism that there are numerous actions which would be both good and bad at once. Utilitarianism is arguably more complex than egoism because it uniquely endeavors to assert one conception as the absolute truth while denying, violating, and suppressing the multitude of divergent conceptions which actually exist.
This seems to undermine the whole point of a moral system. Instead of egoism you should simply reject the idea of morals.
Egoism is alternatively viewed as morally relativistic or ammoral. There is no "instead of" because these conclusions derive from egoism rather than being simply independent from it. There is also nothing fundamentally valuable about morals or the moral system; if you are going to argue against egoism on the premise that it does away with morality then you must defend the value of morality itself.
