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Whether one believes that they have free will doesn't determine whether they actually have it, anymore than believing in the existence of anything else determines its actual ontology. Are you a philosophical idealist? That's the only way your remarks make any sense (and I don't think idealism is logically defensible).
I think that religious instruction is one variable among numerous ones which may or may not affect how someone behaves. Pinning the actions one takes upon a single source seems indefensible to me, particularly where we can observe that two people receive the same or very similar instruction but do not necessarily act the same. This suggests something at play a priori to and/or in conjunction with the role instruction may play.
Regardless of your motives for posting the question, you nevertheless made the claim that religion encourages good people to do bad things is a fact. My response that everything is a presumption is not an unsound criticism of that assertion. It stems from my epistemic nihilism, which questions whether we can know anything to be a fact at all.
What makes you think this is a condition we can advance ourselves out of? That we don't know anything now is not a consequence of our discoveries or technology (or etc.), but of the practical limitations on the human capacity for knowledge. We can't overcome an innate shortcoming.
Whether they are convinced is down to their dispositions and previous experience. As is the role of the religious leaders. I'm a hard determinist, and religion like all ideology strikes me as more an artifact than a strong determinant. Everything is a presumption, but if you want to call this particular one a fact that's fine by me for the sake of discussion. As I said, if we take that as given it's a fairly non-unique observation that holds true for ideology generally. I don't see much cause to single out religion from the pack, really.
No such thing as good people or bad things, for a start.
Further, people adopt whatever perspectives their dispositions and experience compel them to adopt. The same goes for the actions they engage in. The mere existence of a religious idea or doctrine isn't sufficient on its own to induce anyone to "bad" acts. That person must be disposed (a) to adopts the religious belief(s) in question, and (b) act upon them. Should both be fulfilled that suggests some a priori motive to the religiously associated action.
Presuming even that religion did make "good" people do "bad" things, then that would hardly be unique to religion. It would be a consequence of its operating as an ideology, which secular perspectives do just as assuredly. "Bad" things have been done in more than the name of just religion...
Yes, I think I understand your point. In your view, it is sufficient to a right existing that a claim of its existence is made. Whether that claim is actually realized doesn't matter. Does that sound accurate?
What confuses me in this account is that it seems that every right would be both a right and not a right at once. Presumably one would not claim to have a right if someone else were not threatening what one is claiming a right to in the first place, which suggests that the right exists to one party and not to another at the same time. For instance both the fetus and the woman do and don't have the respective rights in question at the same time. The realization of the claim seems necessary to identifying whether or not someone has a right, then.
For that reason, at least, that's why I think that a claim alone is not sufficient to saying a right exists. Perhaps you could say that it exists in concept, but I'm not sure what the utility would be in making such an observation. If I claimed that I could bench 200lbs but couldn't, one could say that I can do it in theory but it wouldn't seem reasonable to say I could bench 200lbs because I claimed I could. Similarly, even if a right exists in concept it doesn't make sense to me to say it actually exists if it isn't realized beyond the claim.