- All Debates
- Popular Debates
- Active Debates
- New Debates
- Open Challenge Debates
- My Challenge Debates
- Accepted Challenges
- Debate Communities
- Argument Waterfall
- New People
- People by Points
Your profile reflects your reputation, it will build itself as you create new debates, write arguments and form new relationships.
I actually think that all reasoning advances from intuition, which dissolves the distinction between emotion and logic for me. So, to me, saying that emotion and logic are in conflict with each other is just saying that different emotions are in conflict with each other. And suggesting that either should/could inform the other is an observation that some emotions are superior to others, and I just don't know how that gets off the ground really. I'm very non-normative on the question, partially because of this.
We don't need to make a "value" judgement on their characteristics (though we inevitably will), it's just that a person's personality is actually a relevant feature for interactions with them.
You cannot know a person's personality through generic identifiers, though. To know someone you have to engage them beyond the generic, otherwise you are filtering them through abstractions that entail things which won't be true of them. Even if that doesn't involves a value judgement (I'm not sure how it couldn't), it's still going to be epistemically inaccurate.
I disagree, when you divide people into advantaged and disadvantaged it creates friction between the groups. I'm not saying we should ignore relative advantages if they exist (because it appears that the relative disadvantages of allegedly advantaged groups are ignored). What I'm saying is that the aim of applied intersectionality is presumably to foster positive intergroup relations and the outcome is in fact the opposite.
I don't think my argument has been properly understood here; I'll try again. My point is that the ideas of (dis)advantage and (dis)privilege can be separated from the belief that identity groups call out something that actually exists. The implication is that we can talk about relative (dis)advantage between groups so long as we understand that the groups don't literally exist and that individuals are uniquely positioned socially. I'm saying that identity politics is partially correct in identifying trends, but that it overextends some of its other claims from those trends. It seems like we might not disagree that much here, but maybe I'm mistaken.
Don't get me wrong I'm simply saying that these narratives cause a major breakdown in intergroup relations and makes acts of aggression between the groups more likely.
Noted. If that's all you meant, then that was my misunderstanding.
It originally was used more to describe the white nationalist crowd because of their use of identity politics but can be applied to anyone using identity politics (Source 1).
Interesting. I'm starting to think 'identitarian' may be a leftist dog whistle to signify identity politics they don't agree with, which could explain why they don't like me using it to talk about their identity politics. :P
So if we have two individuals, both experiencing a neutral experience that we will note as +0; their experience is neither positive or negative in valence. This scale goes from +10 to -10 with +10 being the most pleasant experience one can have and -10 the most negative. [...] In reality things are far more complicated, however our present inability to accurately quantify something does not mean that it does not exist as a quantifiable phenomenon.
The problem with your argument is that there is no such scale. Even if experience were bivalent (it isn't), there are no two people who would share identical conceptions of this scale such that it cannot be said that there exists a singular scale at all. Persons A and B might both note their experience at 0, but that does not mean their experience is the same because what 0 signifies to each may be different and cannot be confirmed as identical.
This is part of why it is oft the case that the greatest evils result from the most benevolent motivations. [...] If you're skeptical about the efficacy of a probabilistic approach then it may be of help to learn about professional poker strategy.
You are assuming moral and experiential neutrality in order to prove the homogeneity you need to get a theory of averages off the ground. Not only is that blatantly circular, but it's quite obviously unsound because if it were true then there would be no moral disagreements and everyone would have the same experiences (which plainly isn't the case).
There also is no such thing as an actual average effect because most of the effects from which the average derives will derive from that mathematical average; the effects are not "on average" anything because they remain distinct with their respective attributes, and the idea of an average effect is strictly that: an idea. Even if it could be said that action X produces the average effect Y then: (a) that does not mean that engaging in act X will necessarily produce Y so we still cannot predict whether our action is moral until after the fact which is useless; and (b) that does not mean that people will associate the same experiential value to the effect Y so you can't accurately predict a net value even for the allegedly average effect Y.
The equivalency between poker and ethics is also false. Poker games advance under a predetermined set of agreed upon rules and probability is predicated upon those parameters and insulated against subjective ascriptions of value or experiences of gameplay. Ethics advances under divergent subjective beliefs about value ascription and is not insulated against subjective experiences; the greater complexity of ethics lies precisely in the heterogeneity of experience and valuation which does not obtain in poker.
Positive experience is a positive effect on a conscious entity, as is giving the conscious entity an increased ability to court positive experience (we do this when we send our children to school, for example).
If experiences are considered as a form of effect then that is true, but what constitutes a positive experience-effect to a conscious entity can only be known by that entity for itself. Beyond that the valuation of experience-effect remains unfounded conjecture. We may believe that we send our children to school and that this is positive for them, but only they know whether that is the case and even what that means.
In my estimation every moral philosophy is about net impact on conscious entities.
Asserting that what you view as the correct conceptualization of morality establishes the parameters for what can constitute moral beliefs begs the question, and if true would only serve to make your observation utterly meaningless. Because, yes, if you define morality to preclude disagreement with your moral beliefs then the only ones left will be in agreement... but that's a pretty boring and uninformative observation, the only function of which is to preclude discussion.
Further, asserting logical entailment between your experience mattering and others' experience mattering does not prove it. Asserting that other positions are nonsensical does not prove that they are. And asserting that 'might makes right' does not concern morality is just factually incorrect given that it is literally an observation about the nature of morality. All of which is besides the point, anyways, since whether other moral philosophies are correct, logical, or sensible is simply irrelevant to whether they exist; that we are discussing them as moral philosophies proves that they do and this disproves your claim.
Plants are adaptive and respond to their environment but that doesn't mean they are in anyway having a subjective experience that they "feel".
I agree. I'm not arguing that plants have subjective experience. I am contesting that pain necessarily entails subjective experience, and also observing that if it did then this would be equally problematic for vegetarian/vegan pain ethicists.
You need to pull from the sciences because they are intentionally attempting to use more precise language to explain a certain set of criteria.
The sciences use language to express findings and it could even be argued that scientists (tend to) use certain words in a particular way. However, this does not mean that the sciences are proving anything about semantic meaning itself which is what lies in question here. The observation that the subject S reacts with X to stimuli Y proves nothing about the meaning of pain which stands in relation to S, because that meaning is something additional being brought to the observation.
Philosophical critique of language is a legitimate point (and linguists study as well). However, as I think I explained before, it becomes a word game when you use metaphorical, literary type language and apply it in the arena of science where it has a very specific type meaning that is not up in the air. [...] but in my estimation, this distinction is blurred in your mind which is part of where we are butting heads on this topic.
Your observations of my argument here seem unfounded. When exactly have I used either metaphorical or literary language at all, let alone in a scientific context? My position is that the meaning of 'pain', whether experiential or behavioral, is extra-scientific. Neither concept of meaning is interchangeable with the immediate observations which science makes of phenomenon, but instead are independent concepts which those scientific observations may be taken to verify, falsify, or leave indeterminate.
On the experiential concept, 'S has pain' is verified only if it is proved that S has the same subjective experience of pain as the observer. On the behavioral concept, 'S has pain' is verified if the observer takes the behavior of S to suggest the same subjective experience of pain as the observer. Science has not proved subjective experiential states in external objects, so the only instance in which 'S has pain' can be experientially verified is when the subject and the observer are the same. Because we regularly use 'pain' in reference to subjects we are distinct from, those uses of 'pain' either have a behavioral meaning or else they have an unverified and therefore empty experiential meaning.
For the vegetarian/vegan who advances their ethics from pain theory the implications are that they must accept either that: (a) pain has a behavioral meaning, in which case plants have pain and cannot be consumed for the same reason that animals cannot be consumed; or (b) pain has an experiential meaning, in which case we cannot know that non-human animals experience pain so eating them is fine (and, actually, eating other humans would also be permissible).
Okay, so if you started picking the pedals off of a flower, this is in some way analogous to pulling off the limbs of a person in your view? As in, both are "torture" of an organism that feels pain and should be treated with similar ethical concern? That is, the term "torture" may not even have an accurate/valuable meaning but if the common view of the word held than both would equivalently be categorized under this term, in your estimation?
Yes. The two cases are perfectly analogous in terms of pain and torture. Whether they are ethically analogous and whether we will feel similarly about them are other questions entirely. This is because pain and torture are not exclusive (or even necessary) considerations for ethics or our preferential responses.
Your earlier explanation of my views was a misrepresentation. You're a bit closer this time around, but still haven't really made an argument which doesn't really come as a surprise.
There is significant disagreement in the philosophy of language about what actually constitutes the meaning of words, with the Descartes-Wittgenstein discourse being a major component. I am not actually arguing for a redefinition of the word 'pain' at all; like Wittgenstein I am arguing that what we really do mean when we say 'pain' is closer to the behavioral than the subjective. No matter how many times you call this argument bullshit that doesn't actually obviate critical thinking on your part, at least not if you want to claim you're being reasonable.
I never said ethical considerations about plant rights bothered you. I said you were confused in thinking that I was bothered by that. Again, I practice value nihilism.
In both cases, no. That person is not acting unethical, and I would be acting neither unethically in torturing the dog nor ethically in caring for it. This does not mean that I have no preference against being tortured or hurting the dog, nor that I lack a preference for caring for the dog. But I would not frame it in ethics; I see ethics and sociability as separable.
I take it you find this objectionable/indefensible, or at least strange. May I ask why?