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Your response presupposes you answered the question. Since when is self concept a requisite for personhood? My response will presuppose that it isn’t.
The framing of the question wasn't coherent to me, so I took it as a rhetorical device setting up your more particular observation. I'm still not entirely sure what you mean by "since when", but I take you to perhaps mean "why"?
The idea that self concept is requisite for personhood is hardly as unusual as you seem to suggest it is. Multiple definitions of person(hood) define that concept ins terms of the self, and the self is regularly defined as an individual as the object of their own reflective consciousness. This contingency of personhood on self is also evident in various legal and social practices, such as the treatment of brain dead patients, so it's not unheard of in practice either.
That this premise is warranted conceptually and practicably, however, is likely not sufficient proof to the unpersuaded since not all definitions necessarily associate the two ideas together in this fashion and not all people agree with the practices this view currently justifies. So I'll elaborate:
'Person' is a purely abstract conception which we project onto an observed, material reality; there is no objectively extant 'person'. It requires conscious reflection to conceive of and apply 'person', which is not an act which a non-conscious entity can engage in. The concept of 'person' exists to call out a collection of entities based on some real or supposed mutual attribute(s). The function of this classification is to orient the ascribing consciousness and its behaviors in relation to its environment, including other consciousness. For a consciousness to find itself in the classification of 'person', it must be self-aware consciousness (i.e. it has self-concept).
While such a self-conceiving consciousness might ascribe 'person' to a non-self-conceiving entity, it is unclear why it would do so. Even were this to occur however, this ascription is projected onto another entity without actually being an attribute of that identity. At no point does this second entity exhibit personhood by orienting itself to its environment through the concept. Only an self-ascription is a sound one; all else is projection which fails to adhere in the object.
First, sleeping people are people.
This is purely tautological. Sleeping humans are people is not nearly as evident an observation. I return your question to you, then, why is it the case that a sleeping human is a person?
Second, self concepts aren’t motivated. They don’t find motivation. Self concept is a product of mind. It is the mind that finds motivations, including motivations to protect the unborn.
By definition the mind is self-reflective consciousness, so you're attempting to draw a distinction which is unsound (and unintentionally rather conceding the point that the self concept is motivated).
Just as the sleeping tend to wake up, the unborn tend not to stay that way.
This does not get at my distinction in the least. While the unborn tend to grow up, I will never be unborn again though it is very likely I will sleep and wake up again many times before I die. The difference is not in the mere potential for a change in condition, but in the possibility of that change in condition applying to the perceiver who conceives of and applies personhood outwards.
It is the fact that we were all once unborn, coupled with natural drive to continue the species which causes the recognition of personhood, by many, in the unborn. This recognition manifests as disfavor for permissivism toward harming/killing unborn people. Reciprocal threat of harm is not necessary for this disfavor to persist as it is much the same with very young people, regardless of their state of wakefulness.
Natural selection motivates a protective instinct towards the unborn and offspring, but has always been conditioned by the practical consequences of attempting to have and raise offspring which the parents cannot support while still ensuring their own survival to reproduce later. Evolution is the very reason that abortion is and always has been a social practice among humans, so appealing there won't work.
The most common reason people are actually opposed to abortion is religious, owing to narratives which assert the sanctity of life. These narratives are motivated by many variables all of which have very little to do either with a serious consideration of self/personhood or reproduction itself (e.g. more children born and raised in the faith strengthens its domain, sanctity of life makes believers feel valued themselves in a meaningless and valueless universe, etc).
We refrain from harming sleeping people for much the same reasons that we refrain from harming awakened people. Not only because we will eventually sleep and awaken again and wish ourselves protected, but because conferring personhood onto another carries with it a moral duty granting a level of respect and dignity. We grant this to small children even though they are not able to reciprocate restraint from harm.
It is not necessary to regard a sleeping human as a person in order to confer protection on them, but it is necessary to do so with other self-conscious humans (including small children) if we wish to identify ourselves as persons too. This makes the one an act of preference and the other of necessity, which further differentiates what you would like to regard as interchangeable scenarios.
It is also conceivable that one could hold false beliefs about what a person is, and operate upon them. So the mere act of regarding any entity as a person does not necessarily entail that they are one. What your explanation does not do is get behind these beliefs and assess their validity.
Ones Self concept is not, and never has been a requisite for their personhood
The basis for this extreme claim is what, exactly?
Just as the decision to abort is left to the proximate parties, so too would the decision to kill the comatose reside with the proximate parties. This is because the selves most closely associated to those parties are the most invested to and affected by the decision.
The difference between an unborn non-person and the sleeping non-person, is that our self-concept cannot find a self-motivated stake in protecting the unborn. None of us is ever going to become unborn again, but we generally do wake up. This creates a self-motivated impetus to disfavor permissivism towards harming/killing the sleeping non-person as the self desires security to be reconstituted when the body awakens. The practice of protecting a sleeping non-person is still very much contingent upon self concept and its connection to personhood in this case, but in a way that cannot apply to the unborn.