Okay I change my mind. Free is a state of being. [...] And freedom can have different meanings. [...]

This is even more problematic. It is effectively certain that for any given government, some people will feel free while others will not. Because the standard has now been rendered purely subjective, we not only have no way to weigh one experience against the other but we must conclude that all governments simultaneously succeed and fail in satisfying this principle. That seems even more useless in identifying democratic governments. Not to mention the incredible improbability of reliably measuring and verifying subjective emotional states of individuals in the first place.

A democracy gives power to the people, so I don't see how satisfaction and trust in government doesn't serve democratic principles.

How, exactly, does a government do that? This seems like an extreme assertion without sufficient warrant, particularly given that my earlier concern about the ways in which freedom is simultaneously taken and given were grounds for you to alter your conception of freedom (and power is really just a substitute for freedom IMO).

This also doesn't address my other objection at all. If (most) people are satisfied with and trust their government because it oppresses a minority, for instance, that is an express contradiction to a principle you have identified as necessary for democracy. And this is not only conceptually plausible, but actually possible and even reasonably probable in light of historical abuses by populist governments. There is absolutely no guarantee that (most) people hold to the other principles you have identified, so their satisfaction and trust might be gained by a government which fulfills principles outside the democratic ones you identified.

This would be a good point if only 51% trusted the government. But in the source I gave you 80-90% in all of Scandinavia had trust in others and the government.

My point holds regardless of how substantial the majority is. If integrity is restricted to how well the single principle of majority rule is satisfied, then it is de facto the same principle. If we expand it to include the other principles, then the dissatisfaction of any minority cannot merely be dismissed and it becomes insufficient to satisfying integrity that 80-90% (or even 99.99%) are satisfied.

I apologize for the mix up, maybe I have confused you with somebody else.

I don't mind especially. ;)

Although I believe the political rules are different in every country, I can't say that this applies for Denmark.

With respect, I can't help but feel that you're a bit caught upon a biased political narrative. All you have done is effectively reiterate your original claim without directly addressing my concerns, and that seems uncharacteristic of you. Saying that the small parties have a lot of power because the big parties needs them is not sufficient for repudiating my arguments as to why we should suspect otherwise (either to Denmark specifically or more generally).

This is especially true of my argument that some minorities might already be so disenfranchised as to not have even small party representation (or, I will add, under-representation), which makes the overall model moot. You ask how this could transpire, and my answer is that the options are fairly diverse. They can include, but are not limited to: disenfranchisement (e.g. of whole groups as of women in your own nation until as recently as the 1920s and non-citizens still today; or, criminal disenfranchisement commonly in other governments), historically rooted socioeconomic disincentives (e.g. likely contributing to the under-representation of of women in government positions in your government, at 39.1% in office versus approx. 50% of overall population), not meeting sufficient criteria for party representation (e.g. not holding at least 2% of the vote in your country, I believe), or party and media financing by either private or public interests, deliberate ballot language choices to preclude immigrant persons, timing and location of polling sites, internet forum algorithms which can be rather easily manipulated to advance certain messaging over other information on platforms or issues, etc. My understanding is also that Dutch citizens who reside two or more years outside of the country are also politically disenfranchised (and however well reasoned, this still satisfies the substance of my objection). Even if none of this had, did, or came to transpire in your country (and do count me very skeptical), that would be insufficient proof that the parliamentarism model in question is inherently capable of preventing this mode of dis-empowerment of non-represented minorities as there is nothing inherent to the model that prevents disenfranchisement. Moreover, the consistency of disenfranchisement not only of minorities of but of near or actual majorities (i.e. women) in the history of most (and I suspect all) parliamentarian models demonstrates that non-inherency very clearly.

Furthermore, even if the small parties had as much power as you suggest they still lack the ability to initiate which means that while this model might approach greater equality it still is not ultimately equitable. You say that it's not only the big guys who initiate, but how could a small party possibly initiate prior to being approached by the big guys in their time of need? Until the big guys need them, they have absolutely no reason to listen to the small parties (much less them initiate anything).

Moreover, it is implausible to think that a small party would be benefited at all by destabilizing the entire government (particularly as they seem most likely to be scapegoated for it). I also remain unpersuaded that most issues would be so critical to any larger party that they would capitulate to any demand, particularly if that demand is at odds with what their base wants from them and especially when there are numerous small parties they can turn to instead. All of this limits the bargaining power of small parties, suggesting that while they have some power (and certainly more than in a bipartisan model, say, like that in the US) it is hardly "a lot" of power. Sure, they can get some concessions, but the fact that they are concessions and the limits on how far those concessions can be pressed is a testament to the unequal footing small parties have in the first place (and this violates one of the principles).

I have presented statistics and articles to support my claim that the Nordic States are successful democracies. You are not convinced, and that's fine, but I would like to see some of your arguments why the Nordic states are not successful democracies.

At no point did I ever say that I thought that the Nordic States are not successful democracies. You have misunderstood my motivations entirely. My objection is not against your evidence, which is why I did not provide any myself, but against the conceptual integrity of your original premise that we could identify governments as democracies based upon whether they satisfy the principles you identified. My point is that no government is readily identifiable as a democracy because of how well it satisfies any set of principles (that merely establishes whether it is regarded as successful), but by whether it professes to value and pursue those principles. This distinction is why we can have a coherent concept of failed democracies, which could not exist under your account since they would simply be "not democracies". My rationale for my position has consistently been that no nation can perfectly satisfy all of the principles, in part because I think that taken together those principles ensure some degree of contradiction (i.e. the democratic model is fundamentally imperfect because it is impossible for it to obtain completely). Moreover, I have argued that other modes of government could satisfy this set of principles but we would intuitively not regard them as democracies if they professed and pursued some other values in addition (or in opposition).