Of all the multiple definitions you suppose there are, I have found few. [...] This “potential” aspect of such philosophical positions do not lend to the error of finding sleeping persons to not be persons, although human.

I suggested that 'person' is a purely abstract conception to suggest that my point was not that definitions categorically or even usually render personhood contingent upon a self, but merely that some include it as a possible definition (e.g. Merriam-Webster no5, American Heritage no3, GNU no3, Century no3). This was and remains against your repeated claim that the self has never been (regarded as) requisite for personhood. Definitions aside, I'm doubtful this is a purely original thought on my part (to the journals with me if it is, though!).

My mere attentions to this point of yours, though, has perhaps given more credence to that particular claim than intended. Really, we might as well set aside this portion of the debate in favor of the rest since I don't know that populism or novelty ultimately bear on the soundness of my position. Whether people do regard a thing one way does not necessarily mean it is reasonable to do so.

U.S. Code Title 1, Chapter 1 [...] which was necessary enough to add another sub-section.

I do not dispute that some legal definitions do not adopt your perspective here. My point was not even that any legal code explicitly endorses my own view (though I suspect somewhere, somewhen it might). Rather, I spoke to what various legal and social practices suggested.

Expressions towards the braindead, for instance, regularly treat the person as not existing anymore (notably this may be the case socially and legally even when there is still a chance for consciousness to remanifest, which disrupts the "potential" based position you mention). Without this implicit endorsement of consciousness to personhood, it's hard to see how such legal permissivism would manifest.

While defining self consciousness into personhood can be done for ones own purposes, as philosophers have in the past, it is commonly not done today. This is likely due to the shortcomings which would arise from such definitions with regards to infants, meditators, athletes, coma victims, actors etc. All of whom have possess personhood which is considered regardless of any decision to end any of their lives.

You implicitly suggest here that the definitions you endorse are not also for the purpose of those who hold them, which is an unsound skewing of the positions; what each of us is engaged in now is not fundamentally different in this respect, except that your approach (arguably) enjoys more popular favor which does not bear on its validity.

The "shortcomings" you mention are only such if you first presume your definition (or its like), which makes that an improbable cause for the (alleged) popular ascension of your view (i.e. in the absence of that view there would be no reason to prefer it over a definition like mine because the latter would not be unfavorable in its own light).

Moreover, if my analysis of the self-concepts investment in its own preservation holds (and I believe it does) then these "shortcomings" do not manifest on my view. A sufficient, alternate account exists to support our intuitions where we want them to be supported.

This statement does not follow from any of the explanation given immediately preceding it. A consciousnesses need not find itself in the classification of ‘person’ in order for a reasonable person to find them in that classification.

I am not arguing here that a consciousness must find itself in the classification of 'person' in order for a reasonable person to find them in that classification. Your interpretation here involves two observers: the original consciousness and a second observer of that consciousness who you claim might reasonably classify that original consciousness as a person. My point is that this second observer might only do so reasonably by first finding itself in the classification of 'person'. Otherwise, there is no motivation which would make the subsequent classification of that other consciousness as a 'person' a reasonable act.

"Even were this to occur however, this ascription is projected onto another entity without actually being an attribute of that identity." You contradict yourself. “'Person' is a purely abstract conception which we project onto an observed, material reality; there is no objectively extant 'person’...The concept of 'person' exists to call out a collection of entities based on some real or supposed mutual attribute(s).

I do not see an evident contradiction between these statements. The identity is that of the observed object and the projected concepts of the beholder are not resident in that object identity (and I use 'identity' here to refer rather more to a collection of identifiers). The projected concept of 'person' lacks a material reality, even if it is associated to an object on the basis of attributes which are real and innate to that object. There is no contradiction here because the attributes on their own cannot constitute 'person'; it requires the observer to associate the attributes to the concept the observer holds. Even when this concept is applied by the observer to their own self as reflective object, the concept remains a projection onto their extant material reality based upon a subjective association of its attributes.

Arguing that self consciousness is actually an attribute of personhood and that therefore personhood is not an attribute of a particular human is like arguing for the objectively correct interpretation of any other string of sounds to which we ascribe meaning.

You have confused my rebuttal of your semantic claim with my primary argument, which is not semantic (though it has semantic implications). My position concerns the metaphysics of the concept of personhood; in short, what is required for it to be an internally coherent concept to itself. My argument is that the concept of personhood lacks this internal coherence if it is not contingent upon a reflective consciousness (i.e. a self).

What is actually the case, however, is that all current definitions of person neglect self consciousness as a necessary component.Furthermore, it has never been a necessary component save for within the interpretations of a few philosophers for the purposes of their own philosophies.

I have addressed this elsewhere, I believe.

As language is a social construct, common social use recorded by commonly accepted sources must hold primacy over any narrow or arcane interpretation unless such interpretations are used specifically for narrow or arcane purposes, such as ones own philosophy. The purpose of a popular debate website cannot be narrow or arcane, unless ones own philosophy is hoped to be compelling enough to change minds. Due in part to the states limitations of requiring self consciousness into the definition of person, your position is not compelling and popular definitions are maintained.

Your are attempting to obviate your burden of proof for your own conception by repeated assertion of a resounding commonality which does not actually exist. Nor would such commonality automatically dictate that your conception must hold primacy over any less or uncommon explanation.

Firstly, that a word is commonly taken to signify one thing at a given time does not assure it any security or preference against it coming to signify something else by the introduction of alternative understandings; the lack of that primacy is precisely why language evolves, and if such primacy existed that evolution could not.

Secondly, when you discuss (allegedly) common conceptions of personhood what you are really calling out is the popular conception of the concept of personhood. This is significant because your analysis remains superficially centered on the beliefs about the concept, rather than on the actual substance of the concept which must necessarily constitute it for it to present coherently enough for there to be beliefs about it. This, too, is why my view need not be compelling to be logically defensible.

Nor would I suppose that my view must lack appeal to others, particularly when taken out of the immediate context of a heavily polarized issue. What the state may delimit on the concept of personhood is not necessarily fixed itself, nor does it necessarily determine the perceptions of those it attempts to apply itself over. Were I appealing to a more mediocre mind with the intent of persuading it to a particular practice, I would not use the same tact I use in a debate with you now.

Because everyone but you thinks so. Even if the thought never occurs consciously, everyone, including yourself, acts as though it is so. This fact is likely the reason current standard definitions support my position, as they record and standardize current products of our socially constructed language.

Argumentum ad populum. Not very compelling to a reasoned thinker I must say. Particular as it rests on an exaggerated and imprecise foundation.

No it isn’t. The definition of mind is: the element or complex of elements in an individual that feels, perceives, thinks, wills, and especially reasons Keep your mind active as you grow older. Or: the conscious mental events and capabilities in an organism. Or: the organized conscious and unconscious adaptive mental activity of an organism.

How, exactly, do you suppose perception to exist without conscious awareness reflecting upon the stimuli? Consciousness itself is the property of awareness, so including it in your argument about the mind not being self-reflective consciousness is rather self-defeating.

This is true. It’s also unrelated to the personhood of infants and the unborn. The personhood of another does not preclude lethal action. & The killing of infants for the well being of the tribe is not new (abortion relatively is). But again, necessary infanticide is not an indication of the infants personhood, how the tribe and parents feel about it is.

I was not drawing any extension from my observations here to my own argument. I was strictly countering your inaccurate presentation of evolution as a rather unilateral benefactor to your position, which you've now conceded it isn't which neutralizes that grounds for your position relative to mine.

Sure, but the moral intuition for the sanctity of human life predates religions, which merely seek to articulate and justify moral frameworks of the time.

I disagree. Religions are not just an attempt to articulate and justify salient moral intuitions; that's far too simple a take on something that's rather complex. Religious orders are invented and perpetuated with deliberate intention by some individuals to facilitate their influence and power over larger groups of people. The narratives religions manifest and their impact on popular beliefs and values derives first from the intuitions and intentions of a smaller group of individuals who can convince others to share their views. Often, this is not done by appealing to mutual values that are already held but rather by appealing to emotional fears and insecurities as a coercive instrument to enforce compliance and facilitate indoctrination (which ultimately produces mutual values). This is true of the larger contemporary world faiths which promulgate contemporary narratives about what life is and its alleged sanctity, largely to ensure their base continues to expand by way of high reproductive rates among their believers (it's actually shocking how blatant they can be about this, too).

I quite disagree. Such moral and philosophical considerations underly much of the religious narrative in many cultures.

Examples? The instances I am familiar with treat self, personhood, and reproduction as tertiary considerations to their more axiomatic assumptions. Which is to say, their treatment is generally superficial and heavily informed by presuppositions which preclude an open-minded consideration of these concepts in their own right.

Then it is necessary to regard a sleeping human as a person if we wish to be identified as persons while asleep. Indeed, everyone but you regards the sleeping as persons. Act against a sleeping person and see who the legal system agrees with. Any reference to any one other person who denies personhood to the sleeping will damage this point. But the larger point concerning definitions will hold. Nonetheless, I challenge you to a reference.

We have no need to be identified as a person when we do not exist as such (and it is literally impossible to wish that we should be whilst asleep). The security of our bodies which will likely constitute our consciousness later will be safeguarded by conscious persons' self-interest; like myself, they consent to the common practice of not killing the sleeping human not because they truly regard that sleeping human as a person but because they fear the consequences of a social order where the sleeping human is not granted certain protections normally reserved for people.

A single reference to any sleeping human as a non-person does not damage the safeguard on my view because the personhood of the sleeping human is completely inessential to the safeguard's function. Again, personhood is not the only possible or salient motivator in considerations like this.

‘Gay’ used to mean happy. Now, most people use this word to denote homo-sexuality. If the vast majority of people use a word incorrectly, but in the same manner, then their use ceases to be incorrect. ‘Gay’ rarely means happy.

This seriously undermines your own semantic argument, but doesn't undermine my argument which is metaphysical rather than semantic. The reason their beliefs would be false in this case is not for transient semantic reasons (as mine is on your view), but because of the requisite nature the concept must take to be internally coherent.

Personhood has become a moral (hence legal) term. Maintaining the position that self consciousness is a requisite for personhood merely serves to maintain consistency with your overarching philosophy of nihilism, which we have debated elsewhere and will not agree on. Maintaining your definition in the service of your philosophy is fine, but it is not definitionally more correct than commonly held definitions. Due to the social nature of the construction of language, your definition is necessarily less correct.

My position is at worst no more in service to my broader perspective than your position is to yours, so it's a rather pointless and rather obviously prejudiced point to keep hitting on. It's rather to your disadvantage to bring it up, even, since nihilism does not require any position to be held for the sake of its coherence and this cannot be said equally of that positive class of philosophies to which your own perspective hearkens.

As my argument is about the metaphysics producing the concept rather than the more superficial semantic beliefs about the concept, your semantic counter-argument has no traction there. Moreover, pursuing it has led you to the contradictory observations both that the common definition must have primacy and that the common definition may change over time. Your position has no innate primacy backing it, and therefore rests upon a weak argumentum ad populum.

Hitler called himself many things. His society was very conservative if you analyse it. He was anti-gay, anti-certain-ethnicity and anti-burdens-on-society.

He was the epitome of what it is to be conservative and bastardised the name 'socialist' by calling himself one despite calling communists the enemy.

But I don't understand? What is it that is 'right' about risking the future generation having disabled people in them? How is that a better thing morally if you could ensure that the vast majority were without detectable 'ailment'?

A lot of feminists are hypocrites. I should tell them to make me a vegan sandwhich. LOL.

These feminists will become terrorists before they stop killing babies.

You keep using false language to add extra shock factor to your insane anti-abortion campaign. A fetus is not a baby.

We leave behind a people who did not pick and choose who was deserving of life.

Your religion instructs its followers to murder non-believers and false prophets, you hypocrite.