I know that I have a consciousness, but I am not sure what Descartes refers to when he uses the term 'I'. If 'I' refers to a sense of 'mineness' then I agree, but if Descartes thinks 'I' refers to my sensations, thoughts and inclinations then I don't.

I know that I have a consciousness and I know that this consciousness has a sense of mineness. I can observe thoughts, I can observe feelings, I can observe the world, and no matter what I will observe, I know that my observation is mine. There's an essential part missing in the cogito. Maybe Descartes means to say that:

I observe my thoughts, therefore I am

But I think it's a bad inference to claim that since there's observation of thought, those thoughts 'are me'. I am not my thoughts, I am not my sensations, I am not my inclinations. Those latter things are just transitioning phenomenon passing through my organism like an apple does. Eaten, processed and passed on. These phenomenons depend not just on how I process them, but their initial arrival is caused by sheer random circumstance.

My hating and loving of persons are not an intrinstic quality of me, they are an intrinstic quality of the dynamical system I have participated in with people that I now happen to hate and love. These things are not reducible to me, and therefore they can't be me. Similarly, thoughts aren't reducible to me in any realistic sense. Thoughts, sensations and inclinations are nothing but transitioning phenomenons passing through my organism like an apple does. Eaten, processed and passed on. To say that these phenomenons are nothing but my processing would be wrong. The impulses that cause me to feel exists regardless of how I feel about them, and in turn how I react and process these impulses depend on my experiences in the world. That is, how I feel is not reducible to me. The only thing reducible to me is my consciousness, and my sense that this consciousness belongs to me. I agree that thoughts, feelings and the rest of it contribute to my narrative sense of self, but to equate my narration with the my existence is like saying that the map is the territory. So in the end my relation to the world isn't me, my thoughts aren't me. So it might perfectly well be that the "I think" aspect of the cogito is not only unnecessary, but actually misleading. Descartes missed the most fundamental aspect of what constitutes his first-person experience. Descartes would be correct if he said that "I observe that when I observe thoughts, that my observation has a sense of mineness, therefore I exists'. But the entire passage involving 'thoughts' is completely unnecessary.

Therefore, the cogito can be reduced the following form:

I observe that my observation belongs to me, therefore I exist.

I agree with this statement somewhat. Rocks, water, air, and other inanimate objects and things exist too, without the ability to think. The word "am" implies existence, so while this would prove that we as living beings exist, it would not apply to nonliving things.

I disagree with this statement, because no matter how much you think, you cannot change what exists in the physical world.

You think therefore your mind is.

There is a difference between a mind and a self and grasping of a self and believing it to be inherently existent causes delusions such as ego, pride, anger, jealousy and hatred which lead to suffering.

It is an illogical argument. To say "I think" is to assume you exist, because you can't think without existing. The premise assumes the conclusion, therefore it is a viciously circular argument.

Also this is simply a perspective debate, there isn't a "side," nor a right or wrong. Just want to see other ideas on the saying.

Yes. You exist as something.

Even if you are just someone else's thought, you still exist as something.

To be non-existent is to be nothing. You can't look at "nothing." o.o

Nothing can't think.