Is the Ontological Argument a valid argument for the existence of the Judeo-Christian God?
Recently, I created the debate asking theists and atheists alike to come together to comment on the "Problem of Evil". Now, to be "fair" to the theists, I've created another debate and I would like to ask you, regardless of whether you're a theist or an atheist, to comment on what I think is one of the more challenging arguments for theism - the "Ontological Argument".
To give a little background, the Ontological Argument was first formulated by the theologian St. Anselm in Proslogion II-III. Since then, many scholars have formulated their own version of this Argument. The arguably most popular version of the Ontological Argument was formulated by Prof. Alvin Plantinga in his 1967 book entitled God and Other Minds.
The Ontological Argument:
- Assumption for reducio: God exists in the understanding but not in reality.
- Existence in reality is greater than existence in understanding alone.
- A being having all of God's properties plus existence in reality can be conceived.
- A being having all of God's properties plus existence in reality is greater than God. (From (1) and (2).)
- A being greater than God cannot be conceived. (From (3) and (4).)
- It is false that a being greater than God can be conceived. (That is the underlying definition of "God".)
- Hence, it is false that God exists in the understanding but not in reality. (From (1), (5), (6).)
- God exists in the understanding.
- Ergo: Hence God exists in reality. (From (7), (8).)
Now, to avoid any discrepancies, Prof. William Lane Craig contributed to this Argument by stating categorically that, "Plantinga takes maximal excellence to include such properties as omniscience, omnipotence and moral perfection.
Yes, the argument is valid
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No, the argument is invalid
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I'm actually surprised that the theists have absolutely nothing to say about one of the strongest arguments for the existence of the Judeo-Christian God! Well, apart from this weak rhetorical question, which can't possibly be seriously accepted as a rebuttal. Side: No, the argument is invalid
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1. Are we really "conceiving" these god-like traits or exaggerating our experience? In the same way we can say "I conceive an infinite number" but we truly don't imagine in our mind what this would really look like. We are exaggerating our knowledge of large numbers than making an assumption of something larger than all of this and calling it infinity--without really imagining it. If we are simply saying something which could be but cannot in our mind imagine, are we "conceiving" it? I don't think we are. So the entire premise is incorrect I think. We have no true concept of this being, just very large exaggerations of things we see around us. 2. The argument was not meant for a Judeo-Christian god, and I think Anselm said as much but it's been awhile. I was under the impression this was to open the idea of a possibility of a being like this to those who believed in no god or other sorts of gods who were not all powerful etc; pagan gods, gods of various natives, ancestor gods, things like that. The idea was to sort of "open" one to an idea of a god like this, than through other arguments convince someone specifically of a Judeo-Christian god. Which ironically to a Jesuit of the time would have little semblance to the current born again type Christian god this argument is most often used to promote. Anselm could have just as easily been cleverly debunking the then current ideas of god's relationship to man and how the then current church went about its business through this argument, being a wily Jesuit and all and not wanting to be burned for his efforts. Side: No, the argument is invalid
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I tend to agree with you. One of my initial oppositions to the ontological argument was also based on the analogy of "infinity". Furthermore, even if it was true that we can conceive of an infinite number, it cannot exist in reality. Mathematically, we would get self-contradictory answers. For example, if I were to ask, "what is infinity minus infinity?" No one would be able to give a satisfactory answer. Side: No, the argument is invalid
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The problem is that there are different types of infinity, which are difficult to distinguish between. There is a infinite amount of real numbers between 0 and 1, and also a infinite amount of real numbers between 0 and 2. If you exclude all the numbers between 0 and 1 from the set of numbers between 0 and 2, you would still have a infinite number but a different set, the set of numbers between 1 and 2. The argument can be summarized as: " existence is greater than non-existence, god has the greatest properties, thus god exist". I would attack the meaning of "greater", that existence is always greater than non-existence, that god has the greatest properties, and so on. It has numerous flaws. Ultimately Its a invalid argument since its premises contradict each other. Also its premises are ambiguous in their meaning if not in their logical representation. Its kinda like the following argument: If katao then god. Katao Thus god. What exactly is Katao though?(other than a random city apparently) Side: No, the argument is invalid
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No. The one fallacy that this Argument does not commit is begging the question. In fact, philosophers for generations since Anselm's own time (notably Gaunilo) have failed to pin-point what fallacy this Argument commits. But as we all know, even if an argument does not commit a logical fallacy, it doesn't mean that the argument is valid. Side: No, the argument is invalid
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I've looked at this argument a few times with the view to disputing it, but have not been able to come up with a reason as to why this argument begs the question. After some reading around I've found I wasn't alone in thinking this but can't find anything I'd regard as conclusive proof. I guess when I first read it here, it seemed to me that we'd have to assume that existence is a property a God would have to have, also that there is a definable perfection, but I am still struggling with these concepts in that I can't find them definitely within this argument. Side: No, the argument is invalid
I'm a bit late on this. But why isn't there something wrong in assuming 'reality' as perceived by us is necessarily a step up? Why does ultimate perfection lead to existence. And what makes us think we can perceive of the kind of excellence that would assume existence? We all laugh when we hear that people used to think we were the center of the universe. But isn't it equally dangerous to assume that we can perceive an appropriate excellence and that our consciousness perceives a reality that is a necessary consequence of such excellence? Side: No, the argument is invalid
I'm going to have to refer to a mind greater than mine. "...there is an evident absurdity in pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by any arguments a priori. Nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies a contradiction. Nothing, that is distinctly conceivable, implies a contradiction. Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent. There is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a contradiction. Consequently there is no being, whose existence is demonstrable." ~David Hume http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Side: No, the argument is invalid
Ah. I see our semantical argument was not in vain. "The Judeo-Christian god" was a move touch. Well logic can't contradict itself. Kalām Cosmological and The problem of Evil are both compelling against omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect, all knowing, Judeo-Christian gods. This logic seems to be shadier so I'll say no…the othe arguments are more compelling. Side: No, the argument is invalid
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Kalām Cosmological and The problem of Evil are both compelling against omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect, all knowing, Judeo-Christian gods. No, the Kalam Cosmological Argument supports the existence of the Judeo-Christian God while the "Problem of Evil" disputes it. The Kalam Cosmological Argument was first formulated by the 10th Century Arabic philosopher Al-Ghazali. However, I think that it is a weaker form of the family of cosmological arguments. If I were a theist, which I am not, I would rather use the Cosmological Argument from Contingency. This logic seems to be shadier I agree, but I don't think you have given any reasons for your claim. Side: No, the argument is invalid
Wow. That was stupid (I even down-voted my own comment haha). I was writing about who the Kalām better and then deleted it because it was irrelevant to my point. Anyway, the problem of Evil, hell, poor design argument (the criticisms of it are as unfounded as th me premise they claim to be as unfounded), omnipotence paradox (although it is a bit silly). Logic can't contradict itself and the arguments against omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, morally perfect Gods are "better" than the ontological. I like Kalaam until the conclusion that the creator has to be the Judeo christian god. I hope to create debates that in succession pick appart the characteristics of God (omnipotent, etc). But to the argument itself, it seals to me that the whole argument only proves that if god exists in the understanding it exists in reality. It never actually proves that his exists in either of those. And, evens assuming it exists, I don't see how it proves that it is the Judeo-Christian god. Side: No, the argument is invalid
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