This is sort of a conundrum. I can't objectively answer this with no other point of view to try to answer from. All of my actions could be predicted like a robot or some code on a computer, only to make me think I'm actually choosing things.

The 'matrix' idea aside, I'd have to say yes free will exists because choices exist, assuming things actually exist of course.

Yes there is such a thing as free will. Since the beginning of everyone's existence, as organisms, we have always made choices. Under normal circumstances, We can do what ever actions we would like to do.

Free will is a possibility. If things start to get purely random down at the quantum level, and if this idea applies to the human brain, then random processes happen in the brain. Now, if random 'things' happen in the brain, they may evolve to become ideas, thoughts and so on. Now if these truly came into existence in an spontaneous and random way, there will be made a whole range of internally contradictory thoughts and ideas. My idea now is that the mind might just be an algorithmic structure that picks out the ideas and thoughts that are beneficial and discards everything else.

In this paradigm everything starts with a random process, and since free will is often opposed to determinism (which is strictly opposite to pure randomness) I think it's safe to assume that free will is possible.

Because I am still in high school I yet to take a philosophy course. But that being said here's stuff I've read.

The Standard Argument Against Free Will:

The Standard Argument has two parts.

First, if determinism is the case, the will is not free.

We call this the Determinism Objection.

Second, if indeterminism and real chance exist, our will would not be in our control, we could not be responsible for random actions.

We call this the Randomness Objection.

Together, these objections can be combined in the Responsibility Objection, namely that no Free Will model has yet provided us an intelligible account of the agent control needed for moral responsibility.

Both parts are logically and practically flawed, partly from abuse of language that led some 20th-century philosophers to call free will a "pseudo-problem," and partly from claims to knowledge that are based on faulty evidence. We shall consider the evidence and show how to detect and correct errors in the reasoning.

Part One - The Determinism Objection

Determinism is true. All events are caused. All our actions are therefore pre-determined. There is no free will or moral responsibility.

Errors and evidence...

Determinism is not "true." If anything physical is "true," it is indeterminism.

Physical determinism is not "true" because physics is empirical, not logical. The evidence has never justified the assumption of strict determinism.

Quantum mechanical indeterminism is extremely well established. While also not logically "true," the evidence for quantum mechanics is better established than classical physical determinism.

Just because some events are adequately determined does not justify the widespread belief in an absolute universal determinism.

Some events are unpredictable from prior events. They are causa sui, starting new causal chains.

The "chain" of events behind a particular cause may go back to inherited characteristics before we were born, others may go back to environmental and educational factors, but some may go back to uncaused creative events in our minds during deliberations.

Decisions have many contributing causes.

We say correctly that our actions are "determined" by our (adequately determined) will. This determination does not imply universal strict determinism (as R. E. Hobart and Philippa Foot showed.

Our will chooses from free alternative possibilities, at least some of which are creative and unpredictable.

The will itself is indeed not "free" (in the sense of uncaused), but we are free.

Part Two - The Randomness Objection

Chance exists. If our actions are caused by chance, we lack control. We can not call that free will because we could not be held morally responsible for random actions.

Errors and evidence...

Randomness in some microscopic quantum events is indeed chance.

But microscopic chance does little to affect adequate macroscopic determinism.

Just because some events are uncaused and involve chance does not justify the widespread fear that all events might be undetermined and random.

Chance only generates alternative possibilities for thought and action.

It is not the direct cause of actions.

We are free, in control, and morally responsible for our choices and actions, because they are adequately determined.

WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE STANDARD ARGUEMENT?:

The most straightforward way to attack the standard argument is to see that the three objections really need to become three requirements for free will.

First, there is a Determinism Requirement - that our actions be adequately determined by our character and values. This requires that randomness not be the direct cause of our actions.

Libertarians do not like this requirement.

Determinists who think that determinism is all they need for free will call themselves compatibilists.

Next, there must be a Randomness Requirement, unpredictable chance events that break the causal chain of determinism. Without this chance, our actions simply the consequences of events in the remote past. This randomness must be located in a place and time that enhances free will, not one that reduces it to pure chance.

Determinists do not like this requirement.

Libertarians say that randomness in the decision itself is all they need for human freedom.

If we can meet these two requirements, we will satisfy the Responsibility Requirement.

We do this by showing

that the determinism we really have in the world is only adequate determinism and

that the randomness we have (especially quantum indeterminism) has negligible effect on that adequate determinism, but provides the alternative possibilities from which our determined will can choose, can make a selection for which we can be responsible.

See the Cogito model for the details and some lesser requirements.

How Do the Determinists (and Compatibilists) Go Wrong?

Determinists and Compatibilists go wrong when they mistakenly assume that any chance or indeterminism will lead directly to random actions for which we cannot be morally responsible.

Though they are metaphysical determinists, they lack confidence in the personal determination of the will, guaranteed by the adequate physical determinism of our macroscopic minds. And as William James said, they have an "antipathy to chance."

Our adequately determined will gives us adequate control of microscopic chaos and chance.

Some of the compatibilists' fears of randomness are quite funny.

"Indeterminism does not confer freedom on us: I would feel that my freedom was impaired if I thought that a quantum mechanical trigger in my brain might cause me to leap into the garden and eat a slug." (J. J. C. Smart)

"For the simplest actions could not be performed in an indeterministic universe. If I decide, say, to eat a piece of fish, I cannot do so if the fish is liable to turn into a stone or to disintegrate in mid-air or to behave in any other utterly unpredictable manner." (P.H.Nowell-Smith)

How Do the Libertarians Go Wrong?

Libertarians go wrong when they try to keep some "freedom" (i.e., indeterminism) in the act of the determining will.

Their particular concern is that an agent must be able to do something different in exactly the same circumstances. Agents could not do otherwise, they say, if they are determined by any preceding events, including the results of their immediately prior "free" deliberations.

Although this is not the pre-determination of the strict causal chain in metaphysical determinism going back to the big bang, libertarians over-react. They have what William James might call an "antipathy to determinism."

Despite advice from Daniel Dennett and Alfred Mele to keep indeterminism in the early pre-deliberation stages, libertarians like Robert Kane, Peter van Inwagen, Laura Waddell Ekstrom, and Mark Balaguer want indeterminism in the decision itself. Kane calls it The Indeterminist Condition:

the agent should be able to act and act otherwise (choose different possible futures), given the same past circumstances and laws of nature. ( A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will, 2005, p.38)

But personal determination of the will is only acting consistently, in character and according to values expressed in one's habits and customs, when one does the same thing in the same circumstances. (Note that identical circumstances are essentially impossible, given the information of the past stored in the world and the agent's memory.)

An adequately determined will, given genuinely unpredictable alternative possibilities, many of which are generated within the agent's mind (thus "up to us"), gives us real choice and gives us control over chaos and chance.

However, an additional mistake made by many libertarians is to assume that these alternative possibilities are probabilities. This shows how even libertartians can mistakenly think that chance is the direct cause of action.

Robert Kane makes this "possibilities imply probabilities" mistake in his "probability bubbles" model of free will. Peter van Inwagen makes this mistake in his instant replays by God.

The libertarians' fears of determinism are not quite as funny, but are equally misplaced.

This problem was already asked so many times and was debunked a long ago, here is the link