I think that what distinguishes Vietnam, Korea, Bosnia, and WWII is primarily that these were all very geo-centric and tied to nation-state entities whereas the present conflict with Islamic extremists is inherently non-geo-centric. These conflicts also centered around national identities, whereas Islamic extremism obviously focuses upon religious identity which renders it capable of engaging sympathies in more nations more readily. These other conflicts also lacked the cyber heavy aspect that current Islamic extremist organizations have utilized. This is not a traditional war or combat situation, which explains why some of our tried and true tactics are no longer working so effectively.

Historically, U.S. military interventions have been more limited than our other forms of intervention until rather recently. When I referenced invasions I was speaking to the 1999 Invasion of Iraq by a US led coalition, the 2003 Iraq invasion, and the War in Afghanistan (2001-2014), and also to some extent to our alleged military support of Israel during the Six Days War. Even if you could argue that this constitutes a limited military history in a region nowhere proximate to us geographically, it is worth bearing in mind that that this list does not include military engagements such as the 1993 missile attack on Iraq or our consistent military stationing throughout multiple decades (e.g. Marines barracks in Lebannon circa 1980s, coastal presence circa 2000s, etc.).

Add to this our extensive history of supplying arms to the region beginning in the 1950s (and including sales to Iran in 1986 to fund our interventions in Latin America), of backing of various coups since the 1940s, of economic sanctions and trade bans from the 1990s on, financial investment in various nations and groups since at least the 1970s, high-fatality accidents such as shooting down a passenger plane in 1988 and killing 290 people, our persistent support for Israel even when it was clearly in the wrong (e.g. 1976 UN vote against Israel for war crimes where U.S. was sole "no" vote), and a practice of switching sides and damaging groups and nations (e.g. the Kurdish rebels trajectory 1960-1975 that gave way to current division, our support for and then opposition to Saddam Hussein, our support for and then opposition to Iran, etc.)... all of that, and you can begin to see where it would be rather easy (and not entirely unfair) to cast us in a negative light.

Many of our interventions in the Middle East have been flagrantly in pursuit of our self-interests and not infrequently at the express detriment of the region. You may call that "noble" if you like, but I prefer to see it without ascribing such arbitrary moral airs to it. The U.S. is a nation, and it is in the nature and function of nations to act in their own interest. Arguably, had the U.S. failed to act upon the opportunity of energy exploitation in the region other nations would have done so and benefited in such a way as to put the U.S. at a relative disadvantage threatening our own power and autonomy.

While U.S. interventions may be entirely defensible under such rationale, that does not render them devoid of undesired consequences. Virtually every action a government can take will have costs as well as benefits, and in this case the largely unforeseen and certainly undesired consequence has been the rise of radical Islam. It is not a coincidence that ISIS and other groups like it have levied accusations of oppression and aggression against the U.S. and other Western powers that have intervened in the region for hundreds of years now (as opposed to, say, China or India, etc.). Our involvement in the region, however you want to justify or defend it, has made us an easy target for the ISIS campaign. ISIS may have distorted the truth, but we gave them a ready basis from which to do it.

We cannot abide ISIS not only because of its hostility towards ourselves and our allies, but because we still rely upon access to the resources in that region. The question is not whether we should intervene, but how. My advocacy is that our interests are best served by acting behind the scenes rather than putting our own military on the ground in these countries. Doing the latter only gives ISIS more fodder for their campaign, however incorrect their representation may be. The former allows us to continue our influence by supporting existing regimes more beneficial to our interests, and it can take many forms - intel, financing, equipment, training, etc. - that are harder to twist into acts of open aggression.

With respect to there being no comparison between US involvement and what ISIS is doing, since causality connects us to the very rise of ISIS itself we bear at least some culpability for the damage this group and its predecessors have brought upon the region.