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Definitions aside, I'm doubtful this is a purely original thought on my part (to the journals with me if it is, though!).
It isn’t, and I should backpedal that position more explicitly. Philosophers have expressed similar views. But the matter hasn’t been of philosophical importance until relatively recently from what I gather.
My mere attentions to this point of yours, though, has perhaps given more credence to that particular claim than intended.
It’s often details that we differ on which spark lengthy philosophical debates.
Without this implicit endorsement of consciousness to personhood, it's hard to see how such legal permissivism would manifest.
The circumstances in which the government allows for the death of a comatose person do not seem to be near as permissive as the circumstances in which the government allows for the killing of other fully conscious and capable people. I’m not sure the moral implications of personhood provide a terribly significant barrier to government permissiveness in killing.
You implicitly suggest here that the definitions you endorse are not also for the purpose of those who hold them, which is an unsound skewing of the positions
Adopting popular definitions does not imply promotion of the implications of said definitions, while creating definitions to maintain philosophical internal consistency does imply such promotion.
except that your approach (arguably) enjoys more popular favor which does not bear on its validity
If the argument hinges of definition, which is socially constructed, then popular favor does bear on its validity. If personhood was closer to your way of thinking, then popular favor would create another term for the personhood I am referring to. Whatever the term, it is definitionally valid. Again, this ultimately comes down to our fundamental differences in metaphysical perspective, which makes you find nihilism reasonable and while I find the opposite. I expect we are both logically consistent from our opposing fundamentals.
in the absence of that view there would be no reason to prefer it over a definition like mine because the latter would not be unfavorable in its own light
But the my view is not absent. If the word were absent, the view would likely create one.
Moreover, if my analysis of the self-concepts investment in its own preservation holds (and I believe it does) then these "shortcomings" do not manifest on my view.
Theories based on self preservation as motive do hold a significant majority of the time, but not always. In situations concerning very very young humans, self preservation commonly fails to hold explaining power.
Your interpretation here involves two observers: the original consciousness and a second observer of that consciousness who you claim might reasonably classify that original consciousness as a person. My point is that this second observer might only do so reasonably by first finding itself in the classification of 'person'. Otherwise, there is no motivation which would make the subsequent classification of that other consciousness as a 'person' a reasonable act.
From what you said here and just before this, should I conclude that you only find acts of self preservation to be reasonable? If so, do you consider the maintaining of ones own desired mental tranquility to be an act of self preservation?
I do not see an evident contradiction between these statements. The identity is that of the observed object and the projected concepts of the beholder are not resident in that object identity (and I use 'identity' here to refer rather more to a collection of identifiers). The projected concept of 'person' lacks a material reality, even if it is associated to an object on the basis of attributes which are real and innate to that object. There is no contradiction here because the attributes on their own cannot constitute 'person'
The attributes constitute the concept. When a physical entity possesses said attributes, then the concept associated with said combination of attributes is also possessed by the entity. In other words, the attributes being resident in the object constitute the concept being resident as well. After all, attributes are little more than constituent concepts comprising the broader concept.
My argument is that the concept of personhood lacks this internal coherence if it is not contingent upon a reflective consciousness (i.e. a self).
You make it contingent upon consistent, actualized self-consciousness, which is what I have challenged. The human has actualized self-consciousness, though not consistently (they sleep). The fetus will have actualized self-consciousness, meaning theirs is potential, like most of their personalizing traits.
Your are attempting to obviate your burden of proof for your own conception
I’m merely defending my reliance on dictionary definitions when discussing the meaning of words.
Nor would such commonality automatically dictate that your conception must hold primacy over any less or uncommon explanation.
If communication is to be clear, one should avoid, for example, referring to an open homosexual as “gay” when trying to convey that they are “happy”. This is because the common conception of words does hold primacy over alternative conceptions unless said alternative is compelling enough to convince others in the conversation to adopt the less common conception. In the case of this discussion, the definition has moral uses, and the less common conception has apparent and commonly undesirable outcomes. These outcomes must be argued for before the less common use of “person” can be accepted.
In other words, you must convince me that the implications of regarding various humans as non-people are desirable, before you can convince me to adopt a less common conception of “person”.
This is as far as I got on my phone. You and I tend to argue details to such an extent that we begin to compose volumes in opposition. I apologize for not completing the rest, but if there is something I missed of specific relevance to the topic at hand, please redirect me to it.
If he had simply said “political extremes”, would you accuse him of conflating the left and the right?
If socialist shut down debate, fascists shut down debate, and the leftnin general shuts down debate, then asking the question regarding all of them makes perfect sense.
There's no point being too hung up on this because all these terms are so frustrating to pin down it's not practical to get too stuck on details.
I find statism to be the most vague, which is why I challenged it. Finding the clearest terms available may be necessary for clarity, particularly in such troll infested waters as these. As you can see first hand.